Online Journal — Columbia Undergraduate Law Review

What Happens in the Lawsuit Stays in the Lawsuit: How the Trump V. CASA Inc. Ruling on Universal Injunctions Upsets the Balance of Powers

A law for all and a ruling for a few, the loss of universal injunctions after Trump V. CASA Inc. earlier this summer signals the arrival of a new era in utilizing universal remedies for unlawful government actions. Trump V. CASA Inc. (2025) is part of a series of lawsuits against President Donald Trump in response to Executive Order 14160 (Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship). Issued on January 20, the executive order aims to reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment and eliminate birthright citizenship for those born to parents that are not citizens or permanent lawful residents of the United States. Individuals, states, and immigrant rights organizations such as CASA sued President Trump alleging the unconstitutionality of the order. As the order was to be implemented on February 19, 2025, various plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary universal injunction—an order that both applies to all people, notwithstanding their classification as a non-party, and that halts enforcement of the executive order, which is likely to cause harm, while it is under judicial review.

Marivi VergaraAugust 17, 2025Courts of equity, injunctions, procedural law, balance of powers

No One is Above the Law, Except Prosecutors

Philosopher and early romanticist Edmund Burke famously warned, “The greater the power, the more dangerous the abuse.” Nowhere is this assertion more evident than within the American justice system, where ironically, sometimes the people trusted to uphold justice become the ones who betray it first. This phenomenon has become rampant throughout the United States as the justice system continues to protect the perpetrators of injustice over and over again. The case of Curtis McGhee and Terry Harrington presents a prime example. In 1983, Curtis McGhee and Terry Harrington were convicted of murder. 25 years later, their convictions were overturned after an investigation revealed that the prosecutors suppressed evidence during trial. Despite the gravity of the misconduct, when it was time to hold the prosecutors accountable, the Supreme Court ruled that the case was not valid to bring to trial. This is just one instance of many; these incidents are a direct result of prosecutors in the United States being protected through absolute immunity from civil suits for actions that were carried out during official duties, even if these actions violate certain constitutional rights. While absolute prosecutorial immunity was originally established to preserve the independence of prosecutors, the reality of its implementation is drastically different. In reality, it acts as a safeguard for constitutional violations, threatening the integrity of the judicial system, and should be altered to ensure civil accountability during times of misconduct.

Finality Over Fairness: The Constitutional Costs of Demanding “Actual Innocence”

In January 2025, Alvin Jardine — a Hawai‘i man wrongfully convicted in a 1990 sexual assault case — was finally able to prove his innocence in court. Despite the overturning of his conviction, however, Jardine remains uncompensated for the nearly 20 years he spent incarcerated for a crime he didn’t commit. Hawai‘i law mandates that compensatory relief requires proof of “actual innocence,” and so far, no exoneree has met this standard under HRS § 661B. Jardine, like others, continues to await compensation.

Requiring actual innocence in post-conviction compensation contexts flips the presumption of innocence upside down: exonerees who have shown reasonable doubt in their convictions and thereby demonstrated their non-guilt now have the burden of affirmatively proving that they did not commit the crime. This article argues such a requirement is legally onerous, ethically suspect, and practically unattainable — especially for individuals who have already endured wrongful imprisonment.

Yunseo ChungAugust 17, 2025

Diplomacy Without D.C.: The Legal Case for State-Level Climate Diplomacy

U.S. constitutional doctrine has created ambiguity surrounding the nation’s capacity to implement climate action domestically. The legal instability caused by the executive branch’s ability to join or withdraw from international agreements unilaterally undermines long-term climate accountability in the court of international opinion. Specifically, the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under President Trump, followed by reentry under President Biden, and a subsequent withdrawal from the current administration, proves the volatility of the U.S.’s approach to entering the commitment. Despite federal ambivalence, multiple states have pursued campaigns to champion Paris commitments from the ground up. These pursuits are by no means exempt from scrutiny. In response to a U.S.-filed lawsuit in 2020 over California’s cap-and-trade carbon reduction plan, Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Bossert Clark released the following: "The state of California has veered outside of its proper constitutional lane to enter into an international emissions agreement…The power to enter into such agreements is reserved to the federal government, which must be able to speak with one voice in the area of U.S. foreign policy.” [4] Despite federal actors under the Trump administration vehemently countering efforts by states to develop cross-border climate policies, this comment will argue that non-federal actors in the United States possess the legal autonomy to engage in the Paris Climate Agreement through subnational diplomacy, presenting a viable and often preferable alternative to federal action.

Evalina SainAugust 17, 2025US States and Climate Law, Environmental Federalism, Climate Diplomacy

Berlin Court Blocks Deportation Case: How a Somali Asylum Case Challenges Germany’s Migration Policy

On May 9th, 2025, the German Federal Police investigated three Somali nationals at the Railway Station in Frankfurt (Oder) near the Polish border. During this investigation, it was discovered that the three individuals had entered the Federal Republic of Germany illegally through Poland without valid travel visas. Later that same day, the group was deported back to Poland, despite expressing their clear intention to seek asylum in Germany. In response, the Somali nationals brought legal action against the Federal Republic, challenging the circumstances under which their deportation took place.

On June 2nd, the 6th chamber of the Berlin Administrative Court ruled in their favour, arguing that the Federal Republic’s actions constituted an unlawful act of refoulement – the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they may be liable to be subjected to persecution, an act which directly violates EU legislation. While the Court’s decision may not be appealed, it has renewed previous discussions around potential changes to the EU’s legal approach to immigration. Indeed, it raises serious legal questions regarding the legitimacy of German Chancellor Merz’s anti-migrant pushback policy as a whole.

Johannes BurgsdorffAugust 17, 2025EU Migration, German Migration Law, Dublin Regulation

Freedom’s Loss to Security: The TikTok Ban That Was Supposed to Save Our Data

The conflict between security and free speech isn’t new, but TikTok has revived a century-old debate. The app, owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, has faced scrutiny over allegations that it collects user data and is able to share it with the Chinese government. [1] In response, the federal government has argued that TikTok poses a serious national security threat, justifying efforts to either ban the platform or force its divestiture. President Donald Trump attempted to ban TikTok with an executive order in 2020, but the effort was quickly blocked in court. In TikTok Inc. v. Trump, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the administration likely exceeded its authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and that the ban likely violated First Amendment protections. [2] The Biden administration initially reversed this approach but later supported legislation aimed at addressing the national security risks posed by the foreign-owned application. [3] This raised a critical constitutional question about the limits of free speech and the government’s power to regulate platforms under the guise of national security. Yet, the underlying legal conflict transcends politics and touches on the core of constitutional governance: does national security override the fundamental right to free speech, or does the First Amendment stand as a shield even against claims of national security?

Love PatelJune 19, 2025first amendment, Free Speech, Media, ban

A New Standard of Proof: Rethinking Evidence and Workers' Rights

The United States court system operates on the presumption of innocence—the doctrine that individuals must be proven guilty based on sufficient evidence. However, the concept of adequate proof becomes increasingly complex when considering recent court decisions, particularly the recent decision in E.M.D. Sales, Inc v Carrera (2024). [1] This Supreme Court decision solidifies the preponderance of evidence doctrine, which fundamentally lowers the burden of proof for employers to exempt minimum wage and overtime benefits under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Consequently, an overt shift in United States policy has taken form, signaling corporate priority over employee protection. As such, a legal dilemma has emerged regarding how the new standard of proof doctrine impacts America's working class, a key aspect of the American economic complex.

Maximus PosadaJune 11, 2025

License to Kill? Self-defense, Sovereignty, and the Laws of War in the U.S. Assassination of Qasem Soleimani

On January 3, 2020, two cars, a Toyota Avalon and a Hyundai Starex, lay in the middle of an access road, engulfed in flames. The convoy was the victim of a U.S. military drone used to carry out precision strikes against known terrorists in the region. But this time, the remotely piloted craft had a unique target: Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, the clandestine operations wing of the Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The demise of Soleimani and his entourage shortly after they landed in Baghdad International Airport immediately launched a global debate over the legality of his execution. Mainstream outlets, including CNN, BBC, and Times teetered between calling it a “killing” and an “assassination.” [1] Others, including the U.S. Department of State, vehemently disagreed, instead deeming it a “defensive strike” supported by “very solid intelligence.” [2]

Soleimani’s killing is anything but a clear-cut case. Questions of its legality and legitimacy rest on nuanced and competing understandings of some of the greyest zones of international law. While the United States justifies the attack as a lawful act of self defense against an imminent threat, critics, including prominent legal scholars, cite its occurrence on Iraqi soil, its preemptive and extrajudicial nature, and its disproportionate effect as evidence of its illegality or, at the least, its lack of legitimacy within international legal frameworks. I argue that the strike on Soleimani cannot withstand scrutiny under three lenses of international law: it failed to meet the “imminent threat” standard for self-defense, it violated Iraq’s sovereignty, and it breached fundamental humanitarian legal principles of distinction and proportionality.

Fragmented Grounds: Chevron’s Collapse and Geographical Disparity in U.S. Asylum Law

Asylum seekers in the United States face a precarious pathway to humanitarian protection, shaped by institutional fragmentation and interpretative discretion. For nearly four decades until June 2024, U.S. courts were required to defer to interpretations issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) under the doctrine of Chevron deference. This legal rule gave federal agencies, such as the BIA, the primary authority to interpret ambiguous legal provisions in immigration law that determine eligibility for asylum. Despite its varying success in promoting national uniformity in the application and interpretation of asylum law provisions, Chevron deference served as a structural safeguard, by allowing agencies with subject-matter expertise, like the BIA, to guide the development of immigration law rather than leaving key questions to vary circuit by circuit. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), overturning Chevron, courts now have greater autonomy to interpret these provisions—such as the definition of “persecution”—without binding deference to agency. [1] Yet, even before the loss of Chevron deference, U.S. courts showed significant differences in interpretation and turn in decisions on asylum claims, especially, between circuits whose regions exhibit different political leanings across the country.

Kiana MehanianMay 27, 2025Immigration law, Asylum, Chevron Deference