On January 3, 2020, two cars, a Toyota Avalon and a Hyundai Starex, lay in the middle of an access road, engulfed in flames. The convoy was the victim of a U.S. military drone used to carry out precision strikes against known terrorists in the region. But this time, the remotely piloted craft had a unique target: Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, the clandestine operations wing of the Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The demise of Soleimani and his entourage shortly after they landed in Baghdad International Airport immediately launched a global debate over the legality of his execution. Mainstream outlets, including CNN, BBC, and Times teetered between calling it a “killing” and an “assassination.” [1] Others, including the U.S. Department of State, vehemently disagreed, instead deeming it a “defensive strike” supported by “very solid intelligence.” [2]

Soleimani’s killing is anything but a clear-cut case. Questions of its legality and legitimacy rest on nuanced and competing understandings of some of the greyest zones of international law. While the United States justifies the attack as a lawful act of self defense against an imminent threat, critics, including prominent legal scholars, cite its occurrence on Iraqi soil, its preemptive and extrajudicial nature, and its disproportionate effect as evidence of its illegality or, at the least, its lack of legitimacy within international legal frameworks. I argue that the strike on Soleimani cannot withstand scrutiny under three lenses of international law: it failed to meet the “imminent threat” standard for self-defense, it violated Iraq’s sovereignty, and it breached fundamental humanitarian legal principles of distinction and proportionality.

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