Finality Over Fairness: The Constitutional Costs of Demanding “Actual Innocence”

Introduction

In January 2025, Alvin Jardine — a Hawai‘i man wrongfully convicted in a 1990 sexual assault case — was finally able to prove his innocence in court. [1] Despite the overturning of his conviction, however, Jardine remains uncompensated for the nearly 20 years he spent incarcerated for a crime he didn’t commit. Hawai‘i law mandates that compensatory relief requires proof of “actual innocence,” and so far, no exoneree has met this standard under HRS § 661B. [2] Jardine, like others, continues to await compensation.

Requiring actual innocence in post-conviction compensation contexts flips the presumption of innocence upside down: exonerees who have shown reasonable doubt in their convictions and thereby demonstrated their non-guilt now have the burden of affirmatively proving that they did not commit the crime. This article argues such a requirement is legally onerous, ethically suspect, and practically unattainable — especially for individuals who have already endured wrongful imprisonment.

I. Defining “Actual Innocence”: Standards, Rationales, and Doctrinal Roots

The term “actual innocence” lacks a uniform legal definition. In many compensation statutes — including Hawai‘i’s HRS § 661B — the claimant must show “actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence” to recover at least $50,000 per year of wrongful confinement. Coffin v. United States (1895) articulates the fundamental judicial principle that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution; [3] however, the dual burden of first having a conviction vacated, then proving innocence effectively shifts the burden of proof back onto the defendant and creates a judicial hurdle at odds with the traditional presumption of innocence.

The imposition of this second evidentiary hurdle is not merely a procedural inconvenience; it reflects an underlying judicial calculus in which the value placed on preserving the finality of convictions often outweighs the imperative to rectify wrongful ones. By conditioning compensation on proof of innocence beyond the mere vacatur of a conviction, legislatures and courts signal a preference for safeguarding the stability of verdicts — even at the expense of individuals who have already met the demanding threshold for overturning them. This tension between fairness and finality forms the backdrop against which broader judicial doctrines on post-conviction relief have developed.

Indeed, doctrinally, the Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins (1993) declined to recognize a freestanding claim of actual innocence on federal habeas, citing the “disruptive effect” it would have on the finality of convictions. [4] In Glossip v. Gross (2015), Justice Breyer pointed to exonerations as reason to reconsider the death penalty, yet the Court refrained from opening relief to those already on death row. [5] While these rulings elevate finality, they also entrench the structural barriers facing wrongfully convicted individuals on their path to justice.

II. “Actual Innocence” as a Barrier to Justice and Compensation

Across the states, compensation statutes vary widely in the degree of proof they demand from exonerees. Colorado’s Exoneration Act, for example, requires clear proof of innocence to secure up to $70,000 per year of wrongful incarceration, while Hawai‘i’s statute similarly imposes a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for “actual innocence.” [6] To date, no claimant in Hawai‘i has met this standard. By contrast, Connecticut has adopted a broader standard. In 2025, the state awarded $5.3 million to Marquis Jackson, exonerated after 18 years in prison, based on vacatur consistent with non-guilt rather than renewed proof of innocence. [7] Connecticut’s model avoids the problem — central to Jardine’s case — of requiring an exoneree to re-litigate facts years or decades after trial in order to prove their innocence. In this sense, it aligns more closely with the presumption of innocence articulated in Coffin v. United States and resists the finality-driven skepticism toward post-conviction relief reflected in Herrera v. Collins.

Hawai‘i’s narrower approach, then, mirrors the restrictive posture in Herrera: it conditions relief not just on the invalidation of the conviction but affirmative proof that the defendant did not commit the crime. Legally, this standard transforms the compensation proceeding into a quasi-adjudication of guilt, effectively reopening previous factual determinations. In practical terms, it requires the exoneree to act as the prosecuting party in a reversed criminal trial, bearing the burden to disprove their guilt rather than requiring the state to do so. This flips the “innocent until proven guilty” principle recognized in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” principle cited in Coffin on their head; the presumption of innocence, restored upon the vacatur of the conviction, is replaced by a presumption of guilt until the claimant can negate their culpability. [8] The very standard used to protect defendants at trials becomes an evidentiary barrier that serves to protect the finality of judicial proceedings over their fairness.

The divergence between these statutory models underscores the central flaw in Hawai‘i’s approach: by maintaining an “actual innocence” requirement, the law effectively denies relief to the very individuals it purports to protect. For exonerees like Jardine, this means that the same structural biases and evidentiary limitations that contributed to their wrongful convictions now doubly serve to block their compensation. A system that conditions redress on a hypocritical evidentiary threshold not only perpetuates injustice but also undermines the deterrent and restorative purposes of compensation statutes. Reforming these laws to focus on the fact of wrongful conviction — rather than on re-litigating guilt — is essential to maintaining the presumption of innocence as a fundamental judicial principle, as well as ensuring that the state fully acknowledges and remedies its role in unjust imprisonment.

III. The Human Cost: Realities for Exonerees Facing a Burden of Innocence

Enforcing an actual innocence standard not only carries bleak judicial consequences, but also inflicts tangible and often devastating real-world harm. By conditioning compensation on disproving one’s own guilt, the law departs from the presumption of innocence and “beyond a reasonable doubt” protections that define criminal adjudication. In the compensation context, this inversion means that the legal system, having already vacated the conviction, withholds redress unless the exoneree can satisfy an even higher factual burden — often decades after the alleged crime, when evidence is irretrievable. The resulting denial of relief compounds the challenges of reentry: unstable housing, limited employment prospects, and untreated health needs become foreseeable legal consequences of a framework that withholds restitution until the impossible is proven. [9]

In Jardine’s case, despite conclusive DNA evidence excluding him as the perpetrator, Hawai‘i’s rigid “actual innocence” requirement has left him uncompensated and struggling to rebuild his life. [10] His plight is not unique. Thomas Haynesworth of Virginia, wrongfully imprisoned for 27 years, endured the indignity and practical barriers of mandatory sex-offender registration for years after his exoneration, a legal disability that undermined the very purpose of his vindication. [11] Though he was ultimately able to secure $1 million in legislative compensation, his story reminds us that legal recognition of innocence often arrives belatedly and burdened with procedural caveats, too slow and too constrained to meaningfully repair the damage wrought by wrongful conviction. In effect, an “actual innocence” standard functions less as a safeguard for public resources than as a final obstacle in a system that has already failed the innocent at every prior stage.

Conclusion

Requiring proof of actual innocence in post-conviction and compensation proceedings inverts the foundational presumption of innocence. It transforms relief into a privilege contingent on clearing evidentiary hurdles often higher than those faced at trial. Legislative models like Connecticut’s should guide reform: once a conviction is vacated on grounds consistent with innocence, the burden should shift away from the exoneree, toward fulfilling the state’s obligation to repair the harm it caused.

Edited by Paige Lawrie 

[1] Madeleine Valera, “Hawaiʻi Passed a Law to Pay the Wrongfully Convicted. No One Has Been Paid,” Civil Beat, February 3, 2025, https://www.civilbeat.org/2025/02/hawai%CA%BBi-wrongful-conviction-compensation-law/.

[2] Haw. Rev. Stat. § 661B-1.

[3] Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).

[4] Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).

[5] Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015).

[6] Duke Law Wilson Center, “Exoneree Compensation Fact Sheet,” December 2024, https://wcsj.law.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ExonereeCompensationFactSheet.pdf.

[7] Ken Dixon, “Connecticut Lawmakers Approve $5.3M for Wrongfully Convicted Man,” CT Insider, January 28, 2025, https://www.ctinsider.com/politics/article/wrongful-conviction-connecticut-claims-exoneration-20165894.php.

[8] In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

[9] Adele Bernhard, “When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction,” The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 6, no. 1 (1999).

[10] Innocence Project, “Reentry & Life After Exoneration,” 2023, https://innocenceproject.org/reentry-life-after-exoneration/.

[11] “Thomas Haynesworth,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Haynesworth.