death penalty — Online Journal — Columbia Undergraduate Law Review

Deadlines and Dead Lives: Actualizing Equity Through Habeas Corpus

The “Great Writ,” or the writ of habeas corpus, is the only court order enshrined in the Constitution. The Latin phrase means “you have the body,” a mandate requiring authorities to bring an inmate before the courts to assess the legality of their detention following their petition for habeas corpus. Although legal scholars have traditionally framed the writ of habeas corpus as an equitable means to protect due process, interpretations of the writ have evolved, leading to increasing restrictions on its availability.

Over the last 30 years, approximately 57 people have been denied the “Great Writ” of habeas corpus in death penalty cases because their attorneys missed deadlines to file for the process. 30 of them have been executed – the most recent being Jeffrey Hutchinson in May 2025. Hutchinson was a Gulf War Veteran who urged his attorney to act swiftly and file on his behalf, yet a combination of attorney misconduct and court error resulted in his death.

Chastity BlairAugust 17, 2025habeas corpus, death penalty, civil rights, criminal justice

What Constitutes Discrimination in the Courts? Proving Discriminatory Intent and Systematic Racism in the Death Penalty

Despite overwhelming evidence of systemic racial discrimination within the United States, it is almost impossible to prove its existence within the court. In the historic decision, McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) decision, the Supreme Court ruled that statistical evidence cannot be used to overturn a previous court decision; specifically, the court stated that statistical evidence proving the presence of racial discrimination is not sufficient to warrant re-evaluation under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [1] The Supreme Court cited the precedent set in Washington v. Davis (1976), which stated that the plaintiff must prove that the state intended to discriminate in order for the case to undergo review through the Equal Protection Clause. [2] Not only is this burden of proof difficult to achieve on its own, but the ruling in McClesky also makes it nearly impossible to meet by excluding statistical data as evidence of intent. Thus, the Supreme Court should reevaluate the standard set for proving discrimination in Washington, which would provide grounds to overturn McCleskeyunder the Equal Protection Clause. By accounting for the specific wording and historical context present in Washington, statistical evidence could qualify as sufficient evidence for discrimination—allowing for challenges regarding racial discrimination to be better accounted for in the courts.

You can be convicted of murder even if you haven’t killed anyone?

With Senate Bill 1437, California narrowed its felony murder rule: a legal doctrine, originating from English common law, which holds defendants criminally liable for a murder—even if they did not kill nor intend to kill—if they participated in the underlying felony. Compared to other nations that practice common law, the United States is the only modern country that uses the felony murder rule. Yet this rule seemingly violates the 8th amendment of the US Constitution, especially when used to sentence the death penalty.

fall 2019Crystal ForetiaJanuary 20, 2020felony murder, criminal justice, death penalty, juvenile incarcerationComment

Mitigation, Time, and the Immorality of Death

The death penalty is a widely contested form of punishment plaguing legal theorists, juries, and society as a whole today. Current death penalty jurisprudence in the United States, which developed as a reaction to the brief abolition of the death penalty following Furman v. Georgia in 1972, has created an arbitrary and immoral system that relies upon a balance between aggravating and mitigating factors. An aggravating factor is “any fact or circumstance that increases the severity or culpability of a criminal act,” [1] and a mitigating factor is “any fact or circumstance that lessens the severity or culpability of a criminal act.”