The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision to grant an application for stay requested by the Trump administration in Trump v Slaughter, alongside various other pending removal cases, merits an examination of the history and constitutionality of statutory removal protections. These protections refer to rules put in place to govern the removal of federal officers. Statutory removal protections are a point of contention because some argue that they infringe upon the rights of the executive power in defiance of the U.S. constitution. Trump v. Slaughter in particular deals with the removal of commissioner Rebecca Slaughter from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). It has been alleged that President Donald Trump did not cite a “for cause” reason for her firing, or, in other words, an acceptable reason as defined by the governing statute of the agency. At the district level, Slaughter’s removal was deemed unlawful, and her reinstatement was ordered, and the Trump administration then unsuccessfully applied for a stay at the appeals level. On September 22, 2025, the Supreme Court granted the stay, meaning that Slaughter will remain fired as the case proceeds and the court decides if the President’s power is being unconstitutionally infringed upon by statutory removal protections. Through an understanding of the scope of executive and legislative power and an examination of precedent established by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935) and Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) it can be argued that Commissioner Slaughter’s removal was unlawful because removal protections are constitutional. Additionally, a consideration of the standards for granting stays brings into question the court’s decision to stay the lower court’s orders.

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