The Shadow Docket's Shadowy History and an Argument for its Alternation

Introduction

Whether it was a dispute over a Texas abortion law in 2022 or a fight over federal research grants in 2025, shadow dockets have been heavily utilized recently to make a variety of decisions. The shadow docket, also known as the emergency docket, refers to a different pathway cases may take when entering the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS). Upon appeal to the highest court, cases may enter either the merits docket, where most landmark cases are decided, or the shadow docket, and progress through the court rapidly. When an appealing party files a petition for a writ of certiorari to SCOTUS, there are two options, to petition the Court and be placed on the list of merit docket cases for the regular season while awaiting approval, or petition for the shadow docket with an emphasis on urgency. [1]

Since the inception of SCOTUS, the Court has utilized shadow dockets to make decisions without the detailed explanations and full hearings that are standard on the merits docket, sometimes even releasing “midnight” decisions. Without proper hearings that are typical of cases on the merits docket. Such practices create an incredible sense of mystery around shadow docket decisions and the reasoning behind their conclusions. For that reason, information and research into this topic is sparse and often contradictary, which only works to further obscure the system. This article will cover the foundational issue with shadow dockets and argue against the current use of them within the United States Federal Court System. As presently employed, the use of shadow dockets by the Supreme Court is unconstitutional due to its inability to fulfill due process, lack of transparency, issues it creates with the separation of powers, and issues with effective application; demonstrating the urgent need for reform.

Defining the Shadow Docket 

The term “shadow docket” was first created by William Baude, a law professor at the University of Chicago in 2015. In practice, the shadow docket is often used for procedural work and can be applied in instances that necessitate timely decisions and allow the Court to evade the extensive process that cases typically undergo on the merit docket. [2] If a litigant wants their case to be expedited, they can complete a special application to a SCOTUS justice, and once five of the justices agree to hear the appeal, it will be placed on the shadow docket. [3] To be approved, the request and situation must demonstrate that without approval of their request, the litigant “would suffer ‘irreparable harm.’” Then, considering only the facts of the case and the lower courts’ decisions, the Court writes their ruling without hearing formal arguments and deliberations. [4]

It should be said that the shadow docket is not inherently malicious and is necessary for the court to handle matters that are emergent and other applications that come up outside of the normal merits docket. Like many lower courts throughout the federal judiciary and state courts, SCOTUS needs a docket where cases can progress through quickly due to their emergent situations or a basic lack of need for full oral arguments. Some historical instances of the shadow docket include emergency stays of execution, which necessitate hasty deliberation. [5] Such was the case in 1979, when quick deliberation was required from SCOTUS in the case of Lenhard v. Wolff (1979). [6] Bishop was set to be executed by Clark County, Nevada, and the petitioner was requesting SCOTUS to rehear an argument that was previously denied to request a stay of execution. Consequently, the Court was able to issue an injunction, temporarily halting his execution. Similarly, a 1952 petition for a stay for execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in early 1953 was decided through the shadow docket. [7] This petition was filed the day before the end of the regular season of that year for SCOTUS, and therefore the Court created this decision outside of their typical term. Most cases of this era remained uncontroversial and Rosenberg v. The United States (1953) represents an outlier amongst then-current shadow docket cases. In addition, this case is indicative of shadow docket cases before their formalization as a practice in the 1980s when the Court terminated their tradition of breaking for the summer, from there the shadow docket underwent significant changes. [8] Now, shadow docket cases could be heard and deliberated upon by all justices rather than following the traditional process of being appealed by a litigant, and formal hearings were suspended for reasons that remain unclear. 

Recent History of the Shadow Docket

Throughout most of the United States’ history, the shadow docket existed without controversy and had been utilized for routine decisions; however, in recent history it has been employed far more frequently to make decisions. 

[9] Within the last decade, the Court has expanded what it traditionally heard as shadow docket cases to include a far greater variety of cases. Since the start of 2025 until November eleventh, 2025, there have been twenty seven shadow docket cases issued by the Executive branch alone. [10] In comparison, from 2017 to 2021 the Executive branch only issued forty one shadow docket applications. [11] Earlier still, from 2000 until 2016, the executive branch, which encompassed the tenure of presidents from both major electoral parties, only utilized the shadow docket eight times. This is troubling further, when looking at the statistics regarding an increase is the expansion of the types of the cases. [12] Of these cases, the Court has increasingly heard more cases across broader scopes, including those concerning Temporary Protected Status for Immigrants and nationwide injunctions. 

[13] And imperatively, the shadow docket system can be dangerous and pose a threat to our judicial system due to the fact that the Court “foregoes its built-in safeguards to be able to issue emergency orders and make summary decisions more quickly” through the shadow docket system. [14] Since 2017, the Court has granted significantly more emergency relief through the shadow docket than before. [15] Now, some experts hypothesize that the Court has “grant(ed) relief in contentious shadow docket cases twice as often as they did just a few years ago,” therefore demonstrating the exigency of this topic. 

Cases 

To gain a better understanding of the current use of the shadow docket it is important to look at specific cases. Below, I will examine three different, impactful cases from 2025 that were deliberated upon on the shadow docket. These cases will demonstrate the level of influence that cases SCOTUS sees on the shadow docket have in application. Therefore, it solidifies the impact of the shadow docket, to then look at arguments against its use when coupled with how monumental the example cases are. 

Amongst recent shadow docket cases, one of the most notable is Trump, President Of The United States, et al. v. Casa, Inc., et al (2025) that came to SCOTUS through the shadow docket on emergency appeal. Although SCOTUS did not rule on the general question of birth right citizenship that was up for debate in this case, they did rule that federal district courts cannot issue universal injunctions. This shifted the balance of power within the nation towards the federal government, and decreased the ability of lower courts to protest what they deem to be unconstitutional orders and laws. [16] The significance of this ruling cannot be understated and is best indicated by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s dissenting opinion, in which she wrote that the Court’s ultimate ruling was “an existential threat to the rule of law.” Many experts continue to debate the ultimate significance and application of this ruling, and its effects will likely be long lasting and wide-spread. Although the practical effects of this ruling remain to be seen, it is clear that now courts will have to pursue other methods for universal relief. In addition, Mila Sohoni, a law professor at Stanford Law School, articulated her opinion on this case’s impact in an article entitled: “Trump v. CASA and the Future of the Universal Injunction.” [17] Sohoni dictates that this “decision seems destined to only embolden the resolve of the executive branch to push the envelope in its attacks on prevailing constitutional understandings and statutory constraints.”

Just a couple months before, in a short opinion from the Court, SCOTUS ruled on Barnes v. Felix et al. (2025) and how the Fourth Amendment should be applied in cases of excessive force. In Barnes v. Felix, Roberto Felix Jr. shot Ashtian Barnes while conducting a routine traffic stop. The lower courts determined that the couple of seconds before Felix fired, while fearing for his life, justified his actions. [18] In this case, SCOTUS ruled that in an instance of alleged excessive force, the claim should be judged based upon the whole circumstance of the encounter. This ruling had the effect of creating greater protections for citizens in encounters with law enforcement. [19] Now, excessive force cannot just be judged on the “moment of threat” test, but instead on the events leading up to the moment which create critical context. This case was significant as it changed how the Fourth Amendment is applied and will have lasting impacts on how violent encounters are evaluated. 

Finally, the Court heard a shadow docket case regarding employment discrimination and Title VII violations in Marlean A. Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services (2025). [20] The petitioner, Marlene Ames, argued that she experienced reverse discrimination when she was denied a promotion over someone from the LGBTQ+ community. In the Court’s opinion, they ruled in favor of Ames and dictated that plaintiffs would no longer need to provide a “background circumstance" as previously required when lodging a Title VII violation of employment discrimination. [21] The removal possibly signifies the Court’s willingness to “emphasize that Title VII is intended to address discrimination in any form without additional obstacles based on the majority or minority status of the plaintiff.” However this ruling is sure to change legislation and practice of Title VII in the workplace, for both employers and employees. 

Now, even with the clear practicality of the shadow docket, its usage has deviated drastically from its original use, and therefore, the system must be adjusted to prevent such oversteps of the court in the future. This is echoed in Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent on the application for stay in Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter (2025). [22] In the case, the Court examined if the removal of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as a Commissioner was lawful. [23] At the conclusion of her written opinion, Justice Kagan wrote that “Our emergency docket should never be used, as it has been this year, to permit what our own precedent bars.”

Arguments Against the Shadow Docket

Transparency

Now with the context of the current use of the shadow docket, it is clear that the shadow docket system creates an atmosphere of mystery due to its lack of transparency. This impedes the public’s ability to understand their decisions and is therefore harmful in its original role to serve the people. In all of the cases above, the opinions that were published have been uncharacteristically short for an opinion from SCOTUS, with some shadow docket cases only containing a few pages of opinion, compared to other merit docket cases with over a 100 pages of written opinion. [24] Further complicating is the fact that “typically they are issued as bare and unsigned orders offering no rationale.” This differs from cases in the merit docket, when Justices will concur or dissent with the majority opinion with detailed explanations. [25] The issue is clear when considering that “There is more transparency in cases decided through the normal process, with arguments for all to see and a detailed decision laying out the legal reasoning.”

Upon examination of the aforementioned transparency issues and their categorically short opinions, it is clear that shadow docket opinions lack proper reasoning and explanation that could help those who must enforce the law and civil citizens understand how the justices’ ruled. This is concerning upon further analysis and application of the nation’s founding ideals. James Madison advocated for a transparent government that enabled the citizenry to think for themselves. [26] In a letter to William T. Barry from 1822, Madison wrote that “A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy.” Then, Madison solidifies his view on the importance of transparency in information in the government in a letter to George Thompson. [27] In the letter, Madison writes that the “advancement & diffusion of Knowledge… is the only Guardian of true liberty.” Like Madison postulated, transparency is one of the key guardrails that citizens can lean on against government overreach and without such, it puts the Court's original purpose at risk, which is to be true to the people.

The impact of this is quite clear and was best explained by Barbara Engstrom, the Executive Director of the King County Law Library when writing for the King County Bar Association. [28] Engstrom wrote that, “reliance on unexplained, unsigned orders to resolve substantive issues of law ultimately serves to undermine the public’s confidence in the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.” [29] A lack of transparency within the federal government poses a great issue as; according to the Pew Research Center, general confidence in our government is reaching record lows, after decreasing constantly for the past two decades. In addition, in 2023, the Center found that public trust in the federal government was the second lowest it has been since the 1960s. [30] Only sixteen percent of Americans “say they trust the government in Washington to do what is right just about always/most of the time,” second lowest only to fifteen percent in the 2010s over a seventy year period of data. 

Due Process

Shadow dockets can be particularly harmful when examining their inability to fulfill the due process requirement in the United States’ court system. In their practice of going without formal hearings, the shadow docket is unable to complete the lengthy and fair process required to decide merit docket cases. There are multiple negative effects of this lack thereof; specifically it creates the danger for hastened decision making and undermines the conventional process of our judicial system with possible larger ramifications. Fundamentally, the informal and rapid nature of shadow cases do not allow for proper deliberation within SCOTUS to decide on increasingly major debates and issues. [31] In corroboration, William Eskridge Jr. wrote in the University of Chicago Law Review, “Summary orders shirk the Court’s responsibility to resolve important legal issues in reasoned opinions informed by complete briefing and oral argument.” 

In the context of Trump v. Casa, questions about the involvement of due process and a full, detailed deliberation the matter requires, could be devastating due to the widespread and evident impact of the Court’s opinion in this case. Nationwide injunctions have been utilized for decades in the federal government, and to disallow their use is unprecedented and monumental. Therefore, by deciding this case on the shadow docket, SCOTUS is making an eminently important decision on how our federal government works with reduced reasoning and argumentation. 

Balance of Powers 

Furthermore, with shadow dockets, there is a large concern for the balance of power issue that this creates for the Court and the rest of the federal system. Since the Constitution, SCOTUS has served as the ultimate arbiter on legal matters. [32] Like Alexander Hamilton outlined in Federalist 78, the federal judiciary was created as a way to ensure that the legislative branch adhered to the Constitution and the people, in policing them, SCOTUS passes judgment on what is considered good behavior. However, this convention and pure intention of the Court is tested when we consider if the Court would ever police itself. If the Court were to step outside the bounds of proper and just decisions, would SCOTUS ever be able to reverse course and refocus their work?

Past history does not seem to suggest that SCOTUS would be effective in regulating itself, but instead expanding its own powers. Principally, Marbury v. Madison (1803) is a prime example in support of this argument. [33] Marbury v. Madison was a case regarding John Adams’ “midnight appointments” to the federal judiciary when one of the appointees, William Marbury, petitioned for their post. This case substantially expanded the powers of the Federal Judiciary by instating the practice of Judicial Review, allowing SCOTUS to rule if a law is constitutional or not. 

Then, a more recent example of this idea of SCOTUS expanding its power can be seen in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024). [34] In this case, commercial fishermen were suing the National Marine Fisheries Service and claiming that the agency did not “follow proper rulemaking procedure” when creating “industry-funded monitoring requirements.” [35] However, upon reaching their conclusion, the Court in effect overruled the past Chevron framework set out by Congress. Now, the judiciary branch would have the power “to exercise its independent judgment to determine the meaning of federal statutes” instead of “defer(ring) to agency interpretations.” [36] This gave the judiciary branch more power over federal agencies. Although the full extent to the impact of this judgment has not been realized yet, it has the possibility of influencing federal agencies when “drafting their interpretations to better mirror the way courts interpret statutes.”

This is not an issue that is isolated to the judiciary branch of the federal government. Self-regulation is also called into question when looking at how Congress has failed time and time again to regulate itself. For example, although insider trading is officially against policy for those in the legislative branch, it is an open secret that many of our representatives benefit from timely information that happen to benefit them financially. It was not until former President Barack Obama passed the STOCK Act of 2012 that insider trading became formally illegal, and even then, the act was long overdue and faced considerable backlash by members of Congress across the aisle. Therefore, this problem extends to multiple branches of the federal government, possibly suggesting a wider, stronger norm that would be harder to break from. 

These examples, coupled with the data mentioned above about the increased use of the shadow docket in recent history only creates more urgency in my argument for the rectification of the shadow docket. 

Moreover the separation of power has been called into question in terms of the power it has recently provided the federal government. Justice Kagan’s aforementioned argument against the stay granted by the majority of the court gave great insight into this issue. [37] At the end of her dissent Justice Kagan said, the shadow docket “should not be used, as it also has been, to transfer government authority from Congress to the President, and thus to reshape the Nation’s separation of powers.” As applied in this case, the ultimate ruling from the shadow docket has the ability to greatly increase the executive branch’s power over federal agencies, specifically in personnel matters in organizations like the FTC.

Therefore, her statement emphasizes that the issue of the shadow docket’s role in the federal government’s separation of power has reached a level of explicit concern. 

Application Practicality 

In addition to the issues outlined above, the shadow docket presents issues of practicality in their application to the legal landscape from SCOTUS down to the lower courts. Due to the properties of the shadow court and their decisions being characteristically short, they often offer little to no instructions for how best to implement their decisions and how the decision would be applied to similar legal instances. Therefore, these decisions, in their obscure nature, only work to further complicate the legal system and how it operates, especially as their decisions on the shadow court signify federal policy. 

This sentiment is shared by lower circuit judges who have to interpret and apply the shadow docket’s decisions. [38] When interviewed for NBC News, twelve multipartisan federal judges concurred “that the terse decisions [from the shadow docket] leave lower court judges with little guidance for how to proceed.” [39] In addition, this sentiment is shared by district court judge John Woodcock Jr. when describing shadow docket orders as having “‘limited precedential value’ due to the lack of ‘full briefing or hearing.’”

Then, exemplifying the effective application issue in the context of one of the cases explored above, Barnes v. Felix, the case changes how the Fourth Amendment is applied to conventional assault cases and Fourth Amendment cases. Therefore, since the opinion for this case was relatively shorter, it then makes it difficult for lower courts to apply this new precedent to future cases. However, it still remains unclear how, entirely, this ruling could change the application of the Fourth Amendment, and with unclear “instructions” the case’s true intended impact will likely be unknown. 

Conclusion

In all, the use of the shadow docket by the Supreme Court of the United States should be reconsidered in the current legal and political landscape, due to its lack of transparency, due process, proper instruction, and the concern of the role it could play on the balance of power in the federal government. [40] As William Eskridge Jr. states in the University of Chicago Law Review, the shadow court system “undermine(s) the Court’s legitimacy” and therefore I argue for its alternation with how it has been currently utilized. Although some argue for the abolition of the shadow courts, due to the practical administration application of the docket, I instead call for its revision from its current use.

Then in further application, shadow dockets on the State level, called “Shadow shadow courts” offer even less transparency in their actions and this is problematic as state courts exercise far more power than SCOTUS does. Shadow shadow dockets are even more opaque as often access to public records from the state court docket is incredibly limited. [41] This is then far more concerning “As the public increasingly turns to state supreme courts to resolve important legal and social issues, (therefore) state shadow dockets warrant careful attention.” 

However, the research into the shadow docket system and federal judicial system is limited. This topic is incredibly convoluted and non-transparent, as I argued above. As our legal sphere constantly evolves, this topic will only necessitate further research. Therefore, it is important to take all information on shadow dockets with “a grain of salt.” My article is positioned to present my best understanding of this topic at this moment in time, and encourage or leave room for future analysis and critical interpretation. 

The shadow docket, like most of the legal system, remains a somewhat “black box,” as some say. However, by writing about this topic I hope to bring greater recognition to this issue and topic. As the shadow docket continues to be utilized and in increasingly more consequential ways, its characteristics and methods cannot remain unexamined. The emergency docket will only continue to create prominent decisions, and the clear inequities in its system only work to discredit the court and its accountability to “We the People.” Therefore, it is important for us to question the practices and systems of government. 

Edited by Ashley Park

[1] Brennan Center for Justice. The Supreme Court “Shadow Docket,” Explained. New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2023. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/supreme-court-shadow-docket. 

[2] “Shadow Docket Term.” EBSCO Research Starters. 2023. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/shadow-docket-term.

[3] “Shadow Docket Term.” EBSCO Research Starters. 2023. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/shadow-docket-term.

[4] Stephen I. Vladeck. Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Texas’s Unconstitutional Abortion Ban and the Role of the Shadow Docket, hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 29, 2021), 117th Cong., 1st sess., 6 objectives, 117th Cong. (2021) (written testimony), Senate Judiciary Committee, 2021

[5] Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306 (1979) 

[6] Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306 (1979)

[7] William Cohen, “Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case,” Cornell Law Review 70, no. 2 (January 1985)

[8] Brennan Center for Justice. The Supreme Court “Shadow Docket,” Explained. New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2023. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/supreme-court-shadow-docket.

[9] “Shadow Docket Term.” EBSCO Research Starters. 2023. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/shadow-docket-term.

[10] Wolfe, Jan, and Nate Raymond. “Judges Vexed by Supreme Court 'Shadow Docket' Rulings in Trump Cases.” Reuters, September 10, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-finds-victories-supreme-court-rush-emergency-cases-2025-06-13/

[11] Stephen Vladeck, The Shadow Docket: How the Supreme Court Uses Stealth Rulings to Amass Power and Undermine the Republic (New York: Basic Books, 2024).

[12] Ballotpedia, “Supreme Court Emergency Orders Related to the Trump Administration, 2025,” https://ballotpedia.org/Supreme_Court_emergency_orders_related_to_the_Trump_administration,_2025.

[13] “Shadow Docket Term.” EBSCO Research Starters. 2023. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/shadow-docket-term.

[14] Stephen I. Vladeck. Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Texas’s Unconstitutional Abortion Ban and the Role of the Shadow Docket, hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 29, 2021), 117th Cong., 1st sess., 6 objectives, 117th Cong. (2021) (written testimony), Senate Judiciary Committee, 2021

[15] Brennan Center for Justice. The Supreme Court “Shadow Docket,” Explained. New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2023. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/supreme-court-shadow-docket.

[16] City of Newark v. J.S., 279 N.J. Super 178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)

[17] Stanford Law School, “Trump v. CASA and the Future of the Universal Injunction,” Stanford Law, July 15, 2025, https://law.stanford.edu/2025/07/15/trump-v-casa-and-the-future-of-the-universal-injunction/

[18] Barnes, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Barnes, Deceased v. Felix et al. No. 23–1239, U.S. (2025)

[19] Cato Institute, “Keeping Cops Accountable: Supreme Court Issues Decision in Barnes v. Felix,” Cato Institute, June 1, 2025, https://www.cato.org/commentary/keeping-cops-accountable-supreme-court-issues-decision-barnes-v-felix.

[20] Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, No. 23-1039 (U.S. 2025)

[21] Maryland State Bar Association, “Examining Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services: Majority Group Discrimination and Title VII,” Maryland State Bar Association, http://msba.org/site/site/content/News-and-Publications/News/General-News/Examining_Ames_v_Ohio_Department_of_Youth_Services_Majority_Group_Discrimination_and_Title_VII.aspx

[22] Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, (U.S. Sept. 22, 2025)

[23] Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, (U.S. Sept. 22, 2025)

[24] Andrew Chung, “Trump Finds Victories at the Supreme Court in Rush of Emergency Cases,” Reuters, June 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-finds-victories-supreme-court-rush-emergency-cases-2025-06-13/ 

[25] Reuters, “Judges vexed by Supreme Court 'shadow docket' rulings in Trump cases,” Reuters, September 10, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/judges-vexed-by-supreme-court-shadow-docket-rulings-trump-cases-2025-09-10/ 

[26] James Madison to William T. Barry, August 4, 1822, The Papers of James Madison, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-0480 

[27] James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1803, The Papers of James Madison, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-03-02-0562 

[28] King County Bar Association, “News & Publications: The Bulletin,” King County Bar Association, https://www.kcba.org/?pg=News-Bar-Bulletin&blAction=showEntry&blogEntry=133479 

[29] Pew Research Center, “Views of the U.S. Political System, the Federal Government, and Federal-State Relations,” Pew Research Center, September 19, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/views-of-the-u-s-political-system-the-federal-government-and-federal-state-relations/

[30] Pew Research Center, “Views of the U.S. Political System, the Federal Government, and Federal-State Relations,” Pew Research Center, September 19, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/views-of-the-u-s-political-system-the-federal-government-and-federal-state-relations/

[31] University of Chicago Law Review, “Trump 2.0: The Removal Cases and the New Shadow Docket,” University of Chicago Law Review, https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/online-archive/trump-20-removal-cases-new-shadow-docket 

[32] Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Paper No. 78. (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1788)

[33] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

[34] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 23-1241, (U.S. 2025)

[35] Congressional Research Service, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and the Future of Agency Interpretations of Law, R48320, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2025)

[36] Congressional Research Service, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and the Future of Agency Interpretations of Law, R48320, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2025)

[37] Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, (U.S. Sept. 22, 2025)

[38] Lawrence Hurley, “In rare interviews, federal judges criticize Supreme Court's handling of Trump cases,” NBC News, September 4, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-trump-cases-federal-judges-criticize-rcna221775 

[39] Wolfe, Jan, and Nate Raymond. “Judges Vexed by Supreme Court ‘Shadow Docket’ Rulings in Trump Cases.”

[40] University of Chicago Law Review, “Trump 2.0: The Removal Cases and the New Shadow Docket,” University of Chicago Law Review, https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/online-archive/trump-20-removal-cases-new-shadow-docket 

[41] University of Wisconsin Law School “White Paper: Shadow Dockets and the Shadow of Shadow Dockets,” State Democracy Research, https://statedemocracy.law.wisc.edu/research/2024/white-paper-shadow-shadow-dockets/