Prepare for the Worst: a Constitutional Examination of Public School Emergency Preparation Procedures

Introduction

Following the turn of the century and the shooting at Columbine High School in 1999, the United States began implementing “active shooter drills.” According to the New York State Education Department, an active shooter drill, or a “lockdown” drill, is defined as the “essential steps necessary to lockdown in an emergency (clear the hallway, lock/barricade doors, hide from view and remain silent until law enforcement gives the ‘all clear’).” [1] As more tragic events unfolded, lockdown drills rapidly expanded. By 2016, approximately ninety-five percent of public schools reported drilling students on lockdown procedures, making these exercises a routine part of the American educational experience. [2] While lockdown drills have long been conducted, some districts have shifted toward increasingly hyper-realistic active shooter simulations which involve artificial gunfire, victims, blood, and more intense sensory elements designed to replicate an authentic school shooting. [3]

The rationale for supporting these more realistic simulations is simple: exposing students to high-stress scenarios better prepares them to respond during a real emergency. [4] If students repeatedly practice their responses under stressful conditions, they become automatic when faced with imminent danger. [5] Yet despite this justification, existing research has produced little evidence that increasingly immersive simulations improve students’ preparedness beyond what traditional lockdown drills already accomplish. [6] Simultaneously, a growing body of research suggests that these exercises may increase anxiety, decrease students’ perceptions of school safety, and create unnecessary psychological distress. [7]

This raises an important constitutional question for public schools: at what point does a school’s responsibility to prepare students for emergencies conflict with its responsibility to protect students from unnecessary harm? Although public schools have a legitimate interest in emergency preparedness, hyper-realistic drills have become constitutionally problematic under the Fourteenth Amendment as they knowingly subject students to foreseeable psychological distress without evidence of direct safety benefits. Existing students' rights policies protect children’s constitutional rights while attending public schools and should assess whether this degree of “emergency preparedness” has crossed the line into state-imposed harm.

Public schools unquestionably have a legitimate and compelling interest in preparing students for emergencies. Following the rise in school shootings over the past two decades, schools have increased their incorporation of lockdown drills into standardized emergency preparedness plans with the goal of teaching students how to respond quickly and safely during a crisis. [8] According to the American Psychological Association, many schools justify these drills on the belief that repeated practice develops “muscle memory,” allowing students to react more quickly under extreme stress rather than making decisions in the moment. [9] In theory, exposing students to emergency procedures before a real crisis could reduce confusion, improve response times, and ultimately save lives. Therefore, this interest in protecting students is not only understandable but essential, and schools should not abandon emergency preparedness altogether. 

However, not all active shooter drills are conducted in the same manner. Traditional lockdown drills generally focus on procedural preparedness by teaching students and staff how to lock classroom doors, remain out of sight, and follow instructions from school or law enforcement personnel. [10] However, public school districts have increasingly adopted hyper-realistic shooter simulations designed to recreate the conditions of an actual school shooting. [11] These exercises may include simulated gunfire, actors portraying injured victims, fake blood, law enforcement using blank rounds, or other high-intensity sensory elements intended to make the experience feel as realistic as possible. [12] Rather than simply practicing emergency procedures, these simulations intentionally expose students to the fear and uncertainty associated with a legitimate attack. [13]

The primary justification for immersive drills includes the argument that greater realism better prepares students to respond during a genuine emergency, yet empirical evidence supporting that assumption remains limited. [14] The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine found that although schools increasingly rely on active shooter drills, “there is no evidence that simulation elements, including deceptive tactics, improve students’ and staff’s perceptions of preparedness.” [15]  At the same time, the committee reported that only six percent of educators surveyed described drills involving simulated gunfire, five percent reported police or security officers firing blanks, four percent reported prop or toy firearms, and only one percent reported the use of fake blood or simulated explosions. [16] Thereby, illustrating that many schools continue to prepare students without relying on these more extreme methods. This distinction is significant. If schools can accomplish the goals of emergency preparedness through less psychologically invasive practices, the constitutional justification for exposing students to heightened distress becomes considerably weaker. 

The constitutional question arises under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, which prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. [17] As public schools are state actors, their policies and practices must comply with the constitutional protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. [18] Although courts have traditionally evaluated claims involving physical restraints or disciplinary actions in schools, the same framework raises the unresolved question of whether schools may intentionally subject students to foreseeable psychological harm when less intrusive alternatives are available.

Although public schools exercise broad authority over students, that authority is not without limits. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that students do not abandon their constitutional protections simply because they enter a public school. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), the Court famously stated that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." [19] Although Tinker addressed students' First Amendment rights rather than substantive due process, it established a broader principle that constitutional protections continue to apply within public schools despite the unique authority schools possess to maintain order and ensure student safety. [20]

The Supreme Court added to this principle under the Fourteenth Amendment in Goss v. Lopez (1975). There, the Court held that public school students facing suspension were entitled to procedural due process before being deprived of their educational interests. [21] While Goss specifically involved student suspensions, the decision reinforced the idea that public schools are subject to constitutional limitations and that students retain protected liberty and property interests while attending public school. [22] The Court acknowledged that schools must maintain discipline and protect students, but it rejected the notion that those responsibilities permit schools to disregard constitutional safeguards altogether. [23]

This framework continued in James Ingraham v. Willie J. Wright Jr. (1977), where the Court considered whether corporal punishment in public schools violated students' constitutional rights. [24] Although the Court ultimately concluded that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require additional procedural protections before corporal punishment was administered, it still recognized that students possess liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. These constitutionally protected interests include personal security and freedom from unjustified government interference, including protection from unjustified bodily restraint. [25] Although hyper-realistic active shooter drills do not involve corporal punishment or physical restraint, Ingraham is significant because it recognizes that students retain constitutionally protected liberty interests while attending public school. [26] The remaining unresolved question is whether those liberty interests may also limit school practices that knowingly subject students to foreseeable psychological harm. 

The Court did not suggest that schools are exempt from constitutional review simply because they are responsible for educating and disciplining students. [27] Instead, it asked whether the specific governmental action at issue was constitutionally permissible. In other words, Ingraham reaffirmed that schools are not free from constitutional limitations simply because they are acting in the interest of maintaining order or protecting students. [28] Like Tinker and Goss, the decision reflects the broader principle that students retain constitutional protections while attending public school, even when schools are exercising their authority. 

Taken together, these decisions establish an important principle: although schools have a broad authority to educate, discipline, and protect students, that authority does not replace the constitutional rights students retain while attending public school. This distinction becomes specifically important when considering hyper-realistic active shooter drills. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed whether these drills violate students' constitutional rights, its student-rights jurisprudence makes clear that practices implemented by public schools are not immune from constitutional scrutiny simply because they are intended to promote student safety. [29] As a result, hyper-realistic active shooter drills cannot only be viewed as a matter of school policy. Instead, they must also be analyzed through the constitutional protections students retain while attending public school.

The difference between traditional lockdown drills and hyper-realistic shooter simulations becomes more important when looking at their psychological effects. Traditional lockdown drills are intended to familiarize students with emergency procedures, while hyper-realistic simulations intentionally recreate the fear, confusion, and uncertainty of a genuine school shooting. [30] Students may hear simulated gunfire, see actors portraying injured victims, or encounter other high-intensity sensory elements intended to make the experience feel as realistic as possible. [31] Although these highly immersive drills remain relatively uncommon compared to traditional lockdown exercises, they continue to be used in schools across the country, raising important questions about the constitutional limits of emergency preparedness. [32]

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine found that repeated participation in active shooter drills has been associated with decreased perceptions of school safety, heightened anxiety, and increased emotional distress among students. [33] Rather than student reassurance of the school’s emergency response capabilities, some drills appear to have the opposite effect by reinforcing the perception that a school shooting is not only possible, but perhaps inevitable. [34] In many cases, the very exercises intended to make students feel safer may instead have the very opposite effect. [35] While that psychological distress might be justified if increasingly immersive simulations provided meaningful safety benefits, the National Academies found only limited evidence that they improve preparedness beyond what traditional lockdown drills already accomplish. [36] At the same time, however, the available research documents substantially more evidence of the potential mental, emotional, and behavioral risks associated with these simulations. [37] Taken together, these findings led the National Academies to recommend that schools avoid simulation exercises involving students and refrain from using deception, high-intensity sensory components, and other hyper-realistic elements during emergency drills. [38]

These findings are also supported by empirical research examining students' own experiences with active shooter drills. In a study by criminology researchers Michael G. Huskey and Nadine M. Connell from the University of Texas at Dallas, the researchers found that students who had participated in active shooter drills during high school reported greater fear, higher perceptions of personal risk, and lower perceptions of school safety than students who had not participated in such drills. [39] More importantly, these findings suggest that the effects of active shooter drills may extend well beyond the exercises themselves, continuing to shape how students perceive the safety of their schools after the drill has ended. [40] Although no single study can determine whether hyper-realistic active shooter drills cause lasting psychological harm, the growing body of research demonstrates that these concerns are no longer merely hypothetical. They are instead increasingly supported by empirical evidence documenting the measurable psychological consequences these simulations may have on the very students they are intended to protect. [41]

These empirical findings matter not only because they document the psychological effects of hyper-realistic active shooter drills, but also because they directly affect the constitutional balance between the government's interest in emergency preparedness and students' protected liberty interests. [42] When the government intentionally subjects students to foreseeable psychological distress, it must be clear that those practices meaningfully advance the very safety interests they are intended to serve. If existing research cannot establish that increasingly immersive simulations provide benefits beyond traditional lockdown drills, the constitutional justification for exposing students to heightened psychological harm becomes disputable.

Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether hyper-realistic active shooter drills violate students' liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment, existing constitutional doctrine still provides a useful framework for thinking about the issue. As Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, Goss v. Lopez, and Ingraham v. Wright collectively demonstrate, students do not forfeit their constitutional protections when entering a public school. [43] Public schools have a broad authority to educate, discipline, and protect students, but that authority must exist within constitutional limits. As hyper-realistic active shooter drills become more common, they raise a constitutional question that existing student-rights jurisprudence has not yet answered.

Legal scholarship also helps explain why this constitutional question deserves greater attention. In her article published in the Cleveland State Law Review, the flagship journal of Cleveland State University College of Law, “Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom: The Failure of the Courts to Recognize Students' Severe Emotional Harm as Unconstitutional,” Emily Suski a former education law professor at Georgia State University College of Law, argues that courts have been reluctant to recognize severe emotional harm inflicted by public school officials as an independent constitutional injury, even though emotional harm can have consequences paralleled in significance to physical harm. [44] She contends that courts often dismiss these claims not because emotional injuries are insignificant, but because constitutional doctrine has traditionally focused primarily on physical harm. [45] Although Suski's article details emotional abuse by school officials rather than active shooter drills, it highlights a broader gap in student-rights jurisprudence: courts have not meaningfully addressed whether severe psychological harm, by itself, may rise to the level of a constitutional violation. [46] This question is not entirely without constitutional support. In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court recognized that the psychological effects of state-imposed segregation could constitute a constitutionally significant injury under the Fourteenth Amendment, demonstrating that constitutional harms are not necessarily limited to physical injuries. [47]

When public schools intentionally expose students to foreseeable psychological distress without clear evidence that increasingly immersive simulations provide greater safety benefits than traditional lockdown drills, courts should more closely examine whether those practices are consistent with existing Fourteenth Amendment principles. [48] Hyper-realistic active shooter drills raise precisely this unresolved question. Rather than questioning the legitimacy of active shooter drills altogether, the issue is that hyper-realistic simulations occupy the constitutional gray area where existing student-rights doctrine, emerging empirical research, and modern legal scholarship intersect. As these simulations continue to evolve, courts may eventually be required to determine whether the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment encompass government practices that knowingly inflict significant psychological harm on students in the name of safety.

Public schools have a legitimate interest in preparing students for emergencies, and active shooter drills have become an increasingly common component of those efforts. Nothing in this analysis suggests that preparing students for emergencies is itself unconstitutional. However, as some schools have adopted increasingly hyper-realistic simulations, the constitutional implications of those practices have become less clear. Existing research suggests that these simulations may expose students to significant psychological distress, while there is limited evidence that the additional dimension of realism provides greater safety benefits than traditional lockdown drills.

Whether those limits ultimately prohibit hyper-realistic active shooter drills remains an open question. Existing student-rights doctrine does not provide a definitive answer, but it does provide a framework for asking the right questions. As schools continue to refine their approach to emergency planning and school safety, courts may eventually be called upon to determine where the government's responsibility to protect students ends, and students' constitutional liberty interests begin.

Edited by Isabel Lu

Sources

[1] New York State Education Department, “Frequently Asked Questions About Amendments to Commissioner’s Regulation §155.17, Effective July 31, 2024,” New York State Center for School Health, 2025, https://www.nysed.gov/sites/default/files/programs/student-support-services/faq_drill_155.17.pdf 

[2] National Center for Education Statistics, Crime, Violence, Discipline, and Safety in U.S. Public Schools: Findings From the School Survey on Crime and Safety: 2015–16, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2017), table 15. 

[3] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, School Active Shooter Drills: Mitigating Risks to Mental, Emotional, and Behavioral Health, (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2025), 306–07. 

[4] Alyson Powell Key, “Do Active Shooter Drills Make Students Safer?,” Monitor on Psychology, January 2026, https://www.apa.org/monitor/2026/01-02/active-shooter-drills-safety 

[5] Key, “Do Active Shooter Drills Make Students Safer?”

[6] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 307.

[7] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 134–58.

[8] National Center for Education Statistics, Crime, Violence, Discipline, and Safety, table 15.

[9] Key, “Do Active Shooter Drills Make Students Safer?”

[10] New York State Education Department, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 1.

[11] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 306–07.

[12] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 306–07.

[13] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 306–07.

[14] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 307.

[15] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 307.

[16] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 306.

[17] Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977).

[18] Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).

[19] Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).

[20] Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1969).

[21] Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).

[22] Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574–75 (1975).

[23] Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).

[24] Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653–54 (1977).

[25] Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672–74 (1977).

[26] Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).

[27] Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672–74 (1977).

[28] Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672–74 (1977).

[29] Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1969).

[30] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 306–07.

[31] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 306–07.

[32] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 306–07.

[33] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 152–58.

[34] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 149.

[35] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 149–53.

[36] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 307.

[37] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 306–07.

[38] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 274, 306–09.

[39] Michael G. Huskey and Nadine M. Connell, “Preparation or Provocation? Student Perceptions of Active Shooter Drills,” Criminal Justice Policy Review Volume 32, Issue no. 1 (2021): 3.

[40] Michael G. Huskey and Nadine M. Connell, “Preparation or Provocation?,” 3.

[41] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 134–58.

[42] Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672–74 (1977).

[43] National Academies, School Active Shooter Drills, 307.

[44] Emily F. Suski, “Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom: The Failure of the Courts to Recognize Students’ Severe Emotional Harm as Unconstitutional,” Cleveland State Law Review Volume 62, Issue no. 1 (2014): 125–26.

[45] Suski, “Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom,” 125–26.

[46] Suski, “Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom,” 125–26.

[47] Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).

[48] Suski, “Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom,” 125–26.