Kahler v. Kansas (2020): Unjust Abolition of the Insanity Defense, or Criminal Justice Reform?
On November 28, 2009, following a divorce and an episode of severe depression, James Kahler drove to a family gathering where he shot and killed his ex-wife, two daughters, and their grandmother. At trial, he was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder. Despite Kahler’s history of mental illness, the defense was barred from using the insanity defense because Kansas state law denies its use when criminal intent can be proven. [1] Kahler appealed his conviction to the Kansas State Supreme Court, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court in Kahler v. Kansas (2020), in which the Court ruled in favor of Kansas in a 6-3 majority. [2] This decision might prima facie appear to contradict basic humanity and past precedent that establishes legal protections for individuals with mental disabilities in criminal proceedings. However, when looking beyond these initial impressions and into the reasoning behind its decision, the Court, with its adherence to precedent, distinction between conviction and punishment, and specification of its narrow holding crafts not only a constitutionally sound decision, but also one that promotes judicial fairness for those living with mental illness.
Before examining the legitimacy of both parties’ arguments, it is important to clarify the narrow scope of Kahler v. Kansas in terms of disputed policies and implications. Most importantly, the state of Kansas does not argue for a wholesale abolition of the insanity defense. [3] Instead, it seeks to limit the applications of these pleas to when a defendant cannot differentiate between right and wrong, or when the defendant's mental state prevents them from possessing criminal intent. Because states maintain the right to legislate proper procedure in their criminal proceedings, Kansas has limited insanity pleas to defendants who cannot possess intent due to mental illness. [4] But just as Kansas is not taking full aim at the insanity defense, so too is Kahler not disputing the full breadth of his prosecution. Although it may seem surprising, Kahler does not contend that his death sentence violates his Eighth Amendment rights. Instead, the petitioner argues that his conviction should constitute a cruel and unusual punishment because his mental illness was not considered at trial. [5] While many critics of the Court’s decision oppose banning the insanity defense, or dispute Kahler’s death sentence, these claims, while interesting constitutional questions, are not analytically relevant to Kahler v. Kansas. The specific question central to this case is whether Kansas can limit applications of the insanity defense without violating a defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
While Kahler’s Eighth Amendment contention may initially seem sound, a meticulous reading of the language of the amendment shows that Kahler’s argument is without legal merit. Critically, Kahler does not claim that punishment for defendants with mental illnesses is unconstitutional, but rather that the conviction of these individuals is what should be considered “cruel or unusual.” [6] While it may certainly sound unjust to convict defendants with mental illnesses, the Eighth Amendment leaves no room to deem mere convictions as unconstitutional. As its name entails, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause deals solely with sentencing (punishment), which follows conviction, and not with conviction itself. [7] In Kahler’s case, the petitioner was first convicted of murder, and then in a separate trial the jury recommended he receive the death penalty. [8] Therefore, when considering the petitioner’s legal argument, it is necessary to separate both phases of the trial, and focus solely on the constitutionality of Kahler’s conviction. Because the petitioner argues his conviction itself violates his Eighth Amendment rights, but the Eighth Amendment solely provides protections in sentencing, not conviction, Kahler’s Eighth Amendment argument has no constitutional footing.
Of course, this textual analysis of the Eighth Amendment is only relevant if case law also supports the claim that mere conviction cannot be considered a cruel or unusual punishment. As such, Kahler’s defense relies heavily on Robinson v. California (1962), the only case in which the court did rule a conviction to be a cruel and unusual punishment. In Robinson, the Supreme Court ruled that a California statute which criminalized drug addiction violated the Eighth Amendment. In the 6-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart explained that narcotic addiction is an illness, and convicting individuals of criminal activity due to mental status is cruel. [9] Because Kahler is diagnosed with a mental illness, this decision appears to support his claim that his conviction violates his constitutional rights. However, further clarification of this decision by the Court illustrates several key distinctions between Robinson and Kahler, all of which show Robinson not to be relevant case law for Kahler.
The first of these clarifications came from Powell v. Texas (1968), in which Leroy Powell, who was convicted of public intoxication and fined $20 in Texas, argued his conviction violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Because Powell was diagnosed with chronic alcoholism, he contended that the precedent set in Robinson should protect him from conviction. [10] In a 5-4 decision, however, the Court ruled in favor of Texas, writing that “the entire thrust of Robinson’s interpretation...is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some act.” [11] In other words, whereas Robinson dealt with passive disobedience of the law, Powell involved active disobedience. In Robinson, the invalidated statute criminalized the status of being a drug addict, rather than the act of using drugs. [12] Because the petitioner in Powell was punished for disobeying laws against public intoxication, rather than simply being an alcoholic, the decision in Robinson does not apply. [13] To see then if Kahler more closely resembles Powell or Robinson requires understanding whether Kahler’s conviction was due to a status (passive) or an act (active). [14] Since Kahler was convicted of murder, not for his status as an individual with a mental illness, this clarification discounts all Eighth Amendment arguments in Kahler’s defense.
However, even if the petitioner’s Eighth Amendment arguments are flawed, his defense is two-pronged, relying on the Fourteenth Amendment as well. This portion of the petitioner’s defense focuses specifically on the Due Process Clause. Kahler argues he was not afforded fair legal treatment during his trial because he was barred from using the insanity defense. [15] Ostensibly, this invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves more room for interpretation than Kahler’s Eighth Amendment argument, as applications of the Due Process Clause are not standardized, and federal standards for criminal trials are not maintained on a state level. For much of Kansas's history, the standard to determine whether the insanity defense was warranted was the M’Naghten rules. These rules were developed in England in the 1840s, and state the insanity defense can be used when the defendant (1) “does not know the nature and quality of his act,” or (2) “where he does not know right from wrong with respect to that act.” [16] However, amidst growing fears of crime in the 1980s, the Kansas legislature became one of only a few states to reject the long-standing M’Naghten rules, and move to a new system. The new standards are not concerned with a defendant’s ability to distinguish right from wrong, but only whether the defendant did or did not have mens rea, or an understanding that they were committing a crime. [17] In Kahler, the petitioner argues that Kansas’s rejection of the M’Naghten rules violates his due process rights under the 14th Amendment. However, the fact most states use the M’Naghten does not legally require Kansas to follow suit.
While states are not entirely free to legislate state-wide judicial processes, the Supreme Court case Montana v. Egelhoff (1996) established the extent to which states can set their own standards of due process. In the case, the respondent, James Egelhoff, was tried and convicted of two counts of deliberate homicide. Because Egelhoff was intoxicated when he committed the crimes, causing a lack of intent and memory of the acts, the respondent argued for his intoxication to be considered in his defense, although it was ultimately barred at trial due to Montana state law. Egelhoff challenged his conviction, arguing his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, but in a 5-4 decision in favor of Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the federal government “should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States.” [18] As such, states have considerable room to set due process rules within reasonable constitutional limits. This case provides Kansas with significant discretion in legislating applications of the insanity defense, making Kansas’s rejection of the two-pronged M’Naghten rules a constitutionally sound approach for dealing with an insanity plea.
However, just because the Court’s decision in Kahler adheres accurately to case law does not necessarily make it socially desirable. The Court’s decision matters not only to James Kahler, but to the fifty million American adults who currently live with mental illness. [19] In that group, which comprises one-fifth of the country’s adult population, no one is identically affected by their illness. However, the nature of conviction is inherently black or white, either guilty or innocent. Considering one’s mental illness at conviction leaves no room for nuance tailored to the specifics of each case. In contrast, accounting for mental illness in sentencing prevents such a blanket approach to criminal justice, promoting fair, individualized treatment for all defendants. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kahler v. Kansas may initially appear a cruel and unforgiving decision, favorable only to opponents of the insanity defense. However, the Court’s decision should be applauded not just by the legal interpretivists, but also criminal justice reform advocates who wish to see a more fair, equitable, and compassionate judicial system for all Americans.
[1] Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. ___ (2020), Justia, online at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/589/18-6135/ (visited May 3, 2020).
[2] Kahler v. Kansas, Oyez, online at https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-6135 (visited May 3, 2020).
[3] Kahler v. Kansas, Legal Information Institute, online at https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/18-6135 (visited May 3, 2020).
[4] Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), Justia, online at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/518/37/ (visited May 3, 2020).
[5] Kahler v. Kansas, Oyez, online at https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-6135 (visited May 3, 2020).
[6]Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. ___ (2020), Justia, online athttps://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/589/18-6135/ (visited May 3, 2020).
[7] Eighth Amendment, Legal Information Institute, online at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/eighth_amendment (visited May 6, 2020).
[8] Kahler v. Kansas, Legal Information Institute, online at https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/18-6135 (visited May 3, 2020).
[9] Robinson v. California, Legal Information Institute, online at https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/370/660 (visited May 3, 2020).
[10] Powell v. Texas, Oyez, online at https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/405 (visited May 6, 2020).
[11] Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), Justia, online at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/392/514/ (visited May 3, 2020).
[12] Robinson v. California, Legal Information Institute, online at https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/370/660 (visited May 3, 2020).
[13] Powell v. Texas, Oyez, online at https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/405 (visited May 6, 2020).
[14] Kahler v. Kansas, Oyez, online at https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-6135 (visited May 3, 2020).
[15] ibid.
[16] Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. ___ (2020).
[17] ibid.
[18] Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), Justia, online at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/518/37/ (visited May 3, 2020).
[19] Mental Illness, National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, online at https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness.shtml (visited May 6, 2020).