An Analysis of Deference in the Court of Arbitration for Sport
On January 2, 2026, after the Italian Sports Federation (FISG) published its list of selected athletes for the Milano Cortina Olympic Winter Games, Italian curler Angela Romei challenged her omission from the Italian women’s team. In response, the Ad Hoc Division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), an arbitration tribunal that resolves disputes in international sports, dismissed her application on February 8, 2026. The sole arbitrator, who wields authority to make a final decision, explained how national sports federations have full prerogative in selecting athletes unless decisions are deemed “arbitrary, unreasonable, or in bad faith,” which Romei failed to provide compelling evidence for. [1] Due to the CAS’s highly deferential standard of review, athletes’ ability to successfully challenge disputes regarding misappropriations in selection criteria or violations of due process becomes limited, which negatively affects the legal protection of athletes.
Because CAS has the power to make important decisions that significantly impact athletes’ careers, many question where its power stems from. CAS’s authority is derived from the Code of Sports-related Arbitration, a document that delineates regulations that oversee the activities of CAS. Article S12 declares that “CAS constitutes Panels which have the responsibility of resolving disputes arising in the context of sport by arbitration and/or mediation pursuant to the Procedural Rules,” demonstrating that CAS has full authority in formally resolving sports disputes. This document also allows CAS to “resolve through the appeals arbitration procedure disputes concerning the decisions of federations, associations, or other sports-related bodies […],” [2] further affirming that CAS is the final arbitrator when it comes to international sports and that they have authority if organizations or parties agree, such as clubs or other athletes. A prime example of the Code’s application was in the case of Sun Yang, a Chinese swimmer who refused to comply with a drug test. The Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA) argued that there were procedural issues, such as failures to rigorously follow testing protocols, and ultimately did not penalize him. However, the World Anti-Doping Agency applied to CAS, and in response, CAS assembled a panel to hear the case through appeals arbitration and found that he did violate anti-doping laws. [3] In this regard, CAS was the final channel that both reviewed and overturned decisions through application of the Code.
The CAS Ad Hoc Division is a more specific document that applies to important sporting events, particularly the Olympics, and is utilized in a temporary manner for decision-making within a narrow time period. Its Article 16 declares, “[t]he Panel shall have full power to establish the facts on which the application is based,” attesting to the idea that arbitrators go beyond reviewing what federations decide and can, on their own, make independent conclusions about different situations. Moreover, Article 17 permits CAS to “rule on the dispute pursuant to the Olympic Charter, the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the rules of law the application of which it deems appropriate.” [4] Under this document, CAS interprets and determines which legal principles to apply to each scenario on its own quickly, which grants it significant power in influencing the careers of athletes.
CAS is also situated as the only final arbitrator within the Olympics, which grants CAS absolute power in deciding all Olympic legal outcomes. Its power to do so stems from the Olympic Charter, essentially a “constitution” that sets forth the rules of the Olympic Games. Section 61(2) designates “any dispute arising on the occasion of, or in connection with, the Olympic Games” to be “submitted exclusively to CAS, in accordance with the Code of Sports-related Arbitration.” [5] This provision is significant because athletes are unable to seek alternatives in national courts, as the Olympic Charter essentially waives athletes’ rights to litigate in national courts, hindering them from externally challenging decisions.
Moreover, there have been cases where CAS has demonstrated a repeated pattern of hesitation to overturn federation decisions, even in contested circumstances. CAS’s deferential nature was visible in Angela Romei v. World Curling, where Italian athlete Angela Romei was not chosen for the Olympic team selection, and instead, Rebecca Mariani, the daughter of the team’s technical director, was selected. Romei, frustrated with this outcome, reacted by arguing that the decision was made only due to nepotism and that there was a conflict of interest. However, instead of examining whether the selection was biased or not, CAS claimed that they lacked the authority to replace the selected athlete even if Romei deserved the remedy she requested. CAS stated, “[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that the Applicant’s criticism of the selection process was founded […] could not order the Respondent to replace Ms Mariani, as no legal basis exists under the Olympic Charter or the applicable regulatory framework for such relief.” [6] Essentially, even though an athlete raises significant concerns about fairness in athlete selection, CAS can refuse to review the case or to intervene by claiming that they are structurally and institutionally constrained in a manner that prevents meaningful review.
Similarly, in the case of Claudia Pechstein, a German Olympic gold medalist in speed skating, the International Skating Union (ISU) suspended her for two years. Through longitudinal profiling, a process of testing biological behaviors over a long period of time, the ISU found “abnormal” blood values. However, Pechstein argued that her unusual blood values were caused by a congenital blood condition and that they failed to discover concrete evidence of any banned substances in her system. CAS upheld the ISU’s two-year suspension because ISU satisfied the “burden of proof,” and Pechstein’s uncommon blood values were sufficient evidence according to their standards. [7] In his critique of CAS’s approach to the Pechstein case, scholar David McArdle notes that “[t]he complexities of longitudinal profiling demand a far more robust legal scrutiny than occurred here.” Longitudinal profiling, which the ISU and CAS used to examine Pechstein, is scientifically complicated, and conclusions should not be made without clear certainty. [8] Thus, it can be concluded that the CAS accepted ambiguous scientific evidence and demonstrated reluctance to overturn the ISU’s final determinations.
Beyond its strict adherence to systematic rules, CAS’s other issue is its failure to individualize justice, which becomes exacerbated by the lack of effective oversight. Not only is CAS highly deferential to existing federation decisions, but its decisions are extremely final and are almost never overturned by broader courts. In Guillermo Canas v. Association of Tennis Professionals, Argentine athlete Guillermo Canas tested positive for the banned drug hydrochlorothiazide, but Canas argued that the substance stemmed from medical treatment that was prescribed to him and that he had no intention to enhance his performance in the first place. [9] However, CAS did not consider his special circumstances and adhered to a deferential standard of review. Furthermore, it applied a structured standard of review that follows uniform, invariable rules instead of considering each case individually. Because CAS does not individualize justice, this prevents athletes from being protected to the fullest extent.
Most significantly, CAS’s authority is reinforced by the limited scope of judicial review in extrinsic courts. As CAS is formally recognized by the International Olympic Committee through its embedment into the Olympic Charter, it wields power over international athletes. At the same time, its authority is also grounded in Swiss law, so appeals go directly to the Swiss Tribunal Court, the highest court in Switzerland. According to scholar Matthew Mitten, in Guillermo Canas v. Association of Tennis Professionals, the Swiss Tribunal Court declared that athletes are hierarchically inferior to CAS and federations, which fully bolstered CAS’s power. The Swiss court ruled that “[e]ven the manifestly wrong application of a rule of law or the obviously incorrect finding of a point of fact is still not sufficient to justify revocation for breach of public policy.” [10] That is, even if CAS misapplies the law, the Swiss court would still not overturn their decision. So, once CAS comes to a conclusion, there won’t be a second chance to redeem oneself, which corroborates CAS’s institutional dominance. Consequently, a power imbalance where athletes are inferior within the global sports legal system emerges. Athletes are denied both individualized justice and cannot appeal to another outlet where they can challenge their decisions.
However, there have been alternate cases where athletes have successfully defended themselves. In Pistorius v. International Association of Athletics Federations, South African athlete Oscar Pistorius, who is amputated below the knee, competed using “cheetah” carbon-fiber prosthetic blades, which were largely prohibited. World Athletics (IAAF) claimed that the usage of prosthetics gave him an advantage and declared him ineligible to compete in events under the IAAF. In this case, CAS used a de novo review, which means that they reconsidered the facts and laws from the beginning and decided that Pistorius was eligible to compete because the IAAF failed to prove that the prosthetics gave him an unfair advantage. They concluded that “[...] the IAAF has not met ‘on the balance of probability’ burden of proof that Rule 144.2(e) is contravened by [Pistorius].” [11]
Moreover, even in some cases where athletes found success, the way CAS operates was still tightly bound by rules that are codified and restrained by procedures, which has bolstered its deferential system that limits athletes’ abilities to change the course of their cases. In Anti-Doping Agency v. Jessica Hardy & United States Anti-Doping Agency, athlete Jessica Hardy tested positive for clenbuterol, and the AAA, the American Arbitration Association, concluded that she violated anti-doping regulations. However, they reduced her suspension from two years to one, arguing that she carried “no significant fault or negligence.” The case was then brought to CAS to argue that the two-year ban should apply instead of the one-year ban. CAS upheld the reduced one-year suspension, but their reasoning was still rooted in the strict structure of the World Anti-Doping Code, as they stated, “[f]ailing a proper jurisdictional basis […] those elements do not per se extend the jurisdiction of this Panel.” [12] Because CAS stated that they cannot consider elements that fall outside of their legal authority, even if there were mitigating factors that should have been deemed relevant or accounted for the fairness of the case, they were still restricted by the jurisdiction. Thus, CAS is unable to expand its breadth of review to consider nuances in cases, creating an imbalance where athletes’ outcomes mainly depend on CAS’s interpretation of previous rules. In this regard, even when athletes or federations successfully appeal, CAS still adheres to a deferential regulatory framework that is inflexible, which sometimes puts them at a disadvantage.
Even though there is no current universal movement against CAS’s operation, its decisions have triggered growing academic criticism of their deferential manner and calls for reform. Scholars, such as David McArdle and Matthew Mitten, are increasingly illuminating CAS’s pattern of uniform standards and arguing that they weaken methodical fairness for athletes because they fail to account for individual circumstances.
Simultaneously, there have been recent institutional and athlete-led calls for reform. The World Players Association, a union representing more than 80,000 players worldwide, is another development that currently supports athlete intervention in CAS decisions. [13] Furthermore, athletes themselves are voicing out and sharing their own experiences with CAS, giving the public a glimpse into the legal limitations of CAS’s constraints and frequent inflexibility. For instance, cyclist Lizzy Banks gave a personal testimony of her experience through an online blog, critiquing CAS as a “damaged and failed system.” [14] These developments bring the question of whether CAS’s current structure can legally protect athletes to the greatest extent. Critiques from academics, scholars, and the public prove significant as they suggest that CAS’s authority, albeit deeply entrenched in documents such as the Olympic Charter, does not go beyond legal scrutiny. Instead, it becomes increasingly subject to developing legal expectations, especially as growing concerns about due process in international sports governance continue to make headway.
Edited by Adanur Nas
[1] Özge Karsu, “CAS Rejects Challenge to Italian Olympic Curling Selection,” American Society of International Law, February 13, 2026, https://www.asil.org/ILIB/cas-rejects-challenge-italian-olympic-curling-selection.
[2] Court of Arbitration for Sport, “Code of Sports-related Arbitration,” https://www.tas-cas.org/generated/assets/pages/index/CAS_Code_2025__EN_--1-.pdf
[3] Peng, Xianwei, and Yanan Wu. “The Sun Yang Doping Arbitration Case: A Commentary from the Perspective of Due Process of Administrative Law.” International Bar Association. https://www.ibanet.org/article/C4A045FD-3E90-499D-9987-0E02817F877F.
[4] Court of Arbitration for Sport, “Arbitration Rules applicable to the CAS ad hoc division for the Olympic Games”, https://www.tas-cas.org/en/arbitration/ad-hoc-division.
[5] International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Charter”, https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/International-Olympic-Committee/IOC-Publications/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf.
[6] Angela Romei v. World Curling (Court of Arbitration for Sport 2026), https://www.tas-cas.org/generated/assets/lists/feb900ba-1137-4b78-a9ff-d68af7869087/OG%2026-06%20Arbitral%20Award.pdf
[7] Pechstein & DESG v. ISU (Court of Arbitration for Sport November 25, 2009), https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-claudia-pechstein-deutsche-eisschnelllauf-gemeinschaft-e-v-desg-v-international-skating-union-isu-decision-of-the-swiss-federal-tribunal-4a-612-2009-wednesday-10th-february-2010
[8] McArdle, David. “Longitudinal Profiling, Sports Arbitration and The Woman Who Had Nothing to Lose. Some Thoughts on Pechstein v International Skating Union.” University of Stirling, n.d, https://dspace.stir.ac.uk/bitstream/1893/3356/1/Pechstein%20final.pdf
[10] Mitten, Matthew J. “Judicial Review of Olympic and International Sports Arbitration Awards: Trends and Observations.” Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 10, no. 1 (2009): 51–67, https://law.pepperdine.edu/dispute-resolution-law-journal/issues/volume-ten/mitten-article.pdf
[11] https://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ANZSportsLawJl/2008/7.pdf
[12] World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v. Jessica Hardy & United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) (Court of Arbitration for Sport 2009), https://www.usada.org/wp-content/uploads/hardy-cas.pdf
[13] About Us - World Players Association. https://www.worldplayersassociation.com/about-us/
[14] Banks, Lizzy. Lizzy Banks. https://lizzybankscouk.wordpress.com/