The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform in Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate
One day before Election Day in 2018, Ted Cruz loaned his Senate campaign $260,000, which the campaign used to meet their financial obligations. Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) caps the amount of post-election contributions that can be used to pay back a candidate’s pre-election loans up to twenty days after the election at $250,000. Although the campaign was able to repay Cruz $250,000, they were not able to repay the remaining $10,000 before twenty days had elapsed. [1] The Cruz campaign sued the FEC under the First Amendment and won in front of a three-judge district court. The FEC then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which heard oral argument in Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate on January 19. [2] The campaign argued that Section 304 violates candidates’ First Amendment right to free speech in that the twenty day limit makes them uncertain whether loans they make to their campaigns will be repaid. Therefore, they are “forgoing the speech” that their loans “would purchase.” [3] On the other hand, the FEC argued that Section 304 protects a “substantial and legitimate” government interest in preventing corruption, and that the Court should trust Congress to create reasonable legislation about campaign funding. [4] The FEC is correct in that Section 304 satisfies any level of scrutiny, including strict scrutiny. A decision in the campaign’s favor would have the potential to make political corruption more likely and weaken the democratic system.
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Monetary Compensation for Miranda Rights Violations
On April 20, 2022, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Vega v. Tekoh. [1] The case followed a criminal trial against Terence Tekoh, where a statement taken from him by Carlos Vega without his Miranda rights being read was admitted into the trial. Miranda rights stem from the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona (1966), which establishes that statements taken from a defendant in custody are only admissible if the defendant understands his right to remain silent and speak to an attorney before those statements were taken. [2] From this case, with some variation across jurisdictions, the Miranda warning was created: “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you.” [3] These rights were upheld by Dickerson v. United States (2000), which decided that Congress cannot overturn Miranda rights by passing a law. [4]
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The Enigma of Public Safety: Debates over the Use of Kendra’s Law in New York City Subways
The beginning of New York City mayor Eric Adams’ administration has brought a variety of new rules and regulations, the most controversial being the “Subway Safety Plan.” [1] As of February 2022, New York City law enforcement officials will employ a “zero-tolerance policy” for violations of subway rules, including sleeping on the subway, an infraction that often applies to homeless people. In the status quo, those who violate subway policies are often subject to a New York state law named Kendra’s Law. Passed in 1999 in response to the death of 32-year-old Kendra Webdale who was pushed in front of the subway by a man suspected to be mentally ill, Kendra’s Law requires individuals to undergo involuntary outpatient treatment, potentially some form of medical treatment, but does not require them to be hospitalized. Adam’s plan expands the use of Kendra’s Law, but because Kendra’s Law violates constitutional principles of due process, it should instead be replaced with Daniel’s Law which better protects patients’ rights to be self-determined in the course of their medical treatment for mental health challenges.
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The Individual or the Free Press: Who Does the Actual Malice Standard Protect?
On February 14, 2022, U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff dismissed former Alaskan governor Sarah Palin's defamation lawsuit against the New York Times. Palin and her legal team argue that a 2017 opinion editorial published in the Times accused her of inciting the 2011 mass shooting in Tucson, Arizona where, infamously, former representative Gabby Giffords was wounded. [1] James Bennet, the New York Times editorial page editor at the time of the Op Ed’s publication, described in the piece what he called a clear link between the shooting and Palin’s campaign ads, which depicted Giffords and other members of the Democratic Party under illustrations of a gun’s crosshairs. Palin's suit was dismissed, however, on the grounds that her legal team had not proved actual malice. Palin has since expressed the desire to take her case to the Supreme Court, an escalation that will surely invite a reconsideration of the actual malice standard and its precedent. In the wake of this renewed debate, however, it is crucial to remember the actual malice standard’s integral role as a function of free press protections. As such, the standard should be preserved in close to its original form.
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