Drawing Democracy Apart: The Emerging Role of State Courts in Determining Gerrymandering
On August 29, 2025, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed Texas House Bill 4, approving a new congressional map that reshaped the state’s electoral districts to potentially increase the Republican Party’s representation in the United States House of Representatives. In response, California Governor Gavin Newsom announced Proposition 50, a proposal to redraw California’s congressional lines in an effort to “fight back” against Texas’s redistricting. While both Governor Abbot and Governor Newsom’s actions are based on partisan conflict, they do call into question the ability of states to redraw electoral maps before encroaching on constitutional limits. The United States Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction over partisan gerrymandering, meaning that state judiciaries are responsible for ensuring electoral fairness. States are turning to mid-decade redistricting —the practice of redrawing maps between the decennial censuses, meant to reflect population changes— and breaking from standard democratic practices. In the post-Rucho and post-Moore era, following the lead of Texas and California, state courts now hold decisive power in determining the constitutional limits of redistricting. The mid-decade efforts seen in Texas and California are indicative of a shift of authority to state courts, possibly leading to a polarized, patchwork democracy in which the partisan majority in each state defines ‘fair electoral representation’ by their own standards.
Currently, the legal role of the federal judiciary is best defined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause. This case was presented to the Supreme Court following mid-decade redistricting in North Carolina without new census data. The Court held that there is no federal jurisdiction to mitigate or prohibit partisan gerrymandering at the state level. Chief Justice John Roberts concluded that such claims of a state’s partisan gerrymandering are “non-justiciable” at the federal level, as there is no Constitutional standard to determine partisanship in redrawing maps, thus giving the Supreme Court no basis to evaluate these claims. Roberts noted that federal courts “are not equipped to apportion political power as a matter of fairness,” effectively assigning state judiciaries jurisdiction over partisan gerrymandering.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Rucho v. Common Cause was built on previous precedents. The 2006 case, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, further clarified the federal role in state redistricting. The Supreme Court ruled that Texas’s mid-decade redistricting was permissible despite arguments that the proposed map provided partisan advantage to Republicans. Yet, the court struck one of the proposed districts for violating the Voting Rights Act of 1965, deeming it an attempt to weaken the voting power of Latino citizens. LULAC cemented the role of federal courts in not striking mid-decade redistricting maps unless claims of gerrymandering were proven. Together, LULAC and Rucho provided precedent for Texas’s redistricting in 2025, establishing that there would be no federal hindrance to redrawing to mitigate partisan gerrymandering, unless such redrawing is done on grounds of racial discrimination.
With federal courts sidelined in determining partisan gerrymandering, a vacuum is created that state judiciaries must fill. The contemporary role of state judiciaries as central authorities in redistricting and gerrymandering is best exemplified in Moore v. Harper (2023). In this case, the Supreme Court dismissed the “independent state legislature theory,” a claim that state legislatures have near-exclusive authority in their assessment and enforcement of election laws. The Supreme Court instead held that state courts, within the “ordinary bounds of judicial review,” can continue to observe and assess redistricting efforts. Moore concluded that state constitutions would determine the legality of mid-decade redistricting, further ensuring the role of state courts as fundamental arbiters in gerrymandering disputes.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in the 2023 case Allen v. Milligan determined that racial gerrymandering and vote dilution remain subject to federal oversight, whereas partisan issues are not. In its 2023 ruling, the Supreme Court cited Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) to strike down Alabama’s congressional map for violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The state had packed Black voters into a single district when they could have been split into two majority-Black districts, thereby limiting their voting power. Under the guidelines of these cases, the current doctrine divides responsibility, making state judiciaries responsible for mitigating partisan gerrymandering, while federal courts focus on reviewing racial gerrymandering.
Many state constitutions explicitly guarantee protection of voter equality or equal elections. These provisions make equal protection the focus of state judiciary constitutional proceedings, further complicating this issue. In League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a proposed congressional map for violating the Constitution of Pennsylvania. Though partisan and racial gerrymandering are not mutually exclusive, minority voters tend to align themselves with one political party. Thus, a map drawn to disadvantage one part can disproportionately affect racial groups. Therefore, the question arises that when a map disproportionately harms a racial minority that primarily votes for one party, should it be treated as a partisan issue for state courts or a racial issue for the federal court?
The state of Texas’s 2025 redistricting efforts used a mid-decade redrawing of maps as a partisan tool to increase Republican political representation; no new census data justified a change in redistricting. Therefore, the mid-decade redistricting in Texas seemed to be politically motivated to elicit partisan advantage rather than address changes in district demographics and populations. In 2025, LULAC and other Texan civil rights organizations argued that the redistricting was guilty of racial gerrymandering, diluting the voting power of Black and Latino voters. The plaintiffs successfully proved measurable racial discrimination under Gingles and Allen. Though Texas officials maintained claims that redistricting was purely partisan, a federal panel disagreed. In November 2025, the court found “substantial evidence” that the map constituted racial gerrymandering, striking down the new map and enforcing the use of the previous map for the 2026 midterms.
However, the redistricting in the state of California prompts different concerns. California Governor Gavin Newsom presented Proposition 50 as a means of maintaining the current representation of the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States Congress, while simultaneously assuring fairness for California voters. Critics argue that Newsom’s proposition goes beyond the historical limits of state autonomy by using redrawn maps in an attempt to mitigate the gerrymandering and legislation of another state. The California GOP has already filed an injunction against the state of California to determine whether the passed district maps were in line with the state constitution, specifically Article XXI, which determines that redistricting in California must be done with “integrity and fairness.” Unlike Texas, where federal courts recently struck down mid-decade maps for racial gerrymandering, California’s redistricting was upheld because it was drawn as an overly partisan act. Proposition 50, initially created and justified as a response to Texas’s new electoral map, will likely remain and be enacted for the 2026 midterm elections, creating an unbalanced redistricting effort in favor of the Democratic Party.
The redistricting efforts in Texas and California exemplify a deeper paradox in contemporary American election law. States possess a new responsibility in preserving electoral fairness, yet such responsibility is being exploited to advance partisan agendas. In Texas, the withdrawal of federal oversight to address partisan gerrymandering has enabled state courts to justify gerrymandering on partisan grounds, even if these effects primarily affect marginalized communities strongly affiliated with one political party. California’s redistricting measures are indicative of a similar issue. Advocates for Newsom’s plan argue that the measure is an attempt to protect California voters, whereas critics believe Newsom is going beyond the bounds of state authority by intervening in national political conflict.
Taken together, Texas and California’s redistricting, while seemingly different, are the shared result of the Supreme Court’s retreat in regulating partisan gerrymandering. Now, the governing bodies of states have become both the initiators and regulators of redistricting. This duality in state governance creates a dichotomy within the institutions responsible for maintaining electoral equality and the partisan agendas that are determined to manipulate this legal gray area. More states are attempting to assert their respective authority over redistricting, ensuring that state courts will have increased responsibility in interpreting gerrymandering without clear federal standards.
As partisan redistricting becomes an increasingly important issue, as shown in the conflict between Texas and California, state courts hold a significant role in ensuring that electoral representation is fair. By stepping back when determining partisan fairness in each state, the Supreme Court has created a legal gray area where democracy can look different in each state. With no legal standard established by the federal judiciary for ensuring fair representation and determining or mitigating partisan gerrymandering, the responsibility is left to state judiciaries and state constitutions. State judiciaries and state constitutions are vastly different from one another, varying across the country. Therefore, democracy and electoral representation may be distinctly different in each state. The role of state governments in this new duty must be done with careful consideration, as it may lead to deeper political fragmentation and polarization. To preserve the legitimacy of American democracy, states must ensure their constitutions clearly define a criterion for determining gerrymandering in the future, or the Supreme Court may need to define clear constitutional guidance to ensure democratic integrity.