Authority and Overreach: The Illegality of U.S Military Strikes in the Caribbean Sea

Since late July 2025, the Trump administration has been authorizing military strikes in the Caribbean against individuals deemed “terrorists.” Specifically, after the administration announced that it would prevent the entry of illicit drugs into the United States, fourteen known strikes have killed at least 69 “narco-terrorists” on boats. Although the Trump administration has defended its actions as self-defense against these so-called “terrorists,” it has not provided sufficient evidence as to whether the individuals killed were actually involved in drug trafficking, limiting transparency about the identities of those who were on board. Thus, there has been significant concern about whether the U.S. president can lawfully authorize military strikes against suspected drug traffickers in international waters under national and international law. By authorizing military strikes in international waters near Venezuela without clear evidence of an armed attack or congressional approval, the Trump administration is undermining international law and violating constitutional limits on presidential war powers, setting a dangerous precedent for the unilateral use of force.

Given that international law permits force only in genuine cases of self-defense and that there is no evidence that the individuals on the boats initiated an attack first or intended to enter the United States, the administration’s actions are legally questionable. As a member of the United Nations, the United States is bound by Article 51 of the UN Charter (1945), which explicitly limits the use of military force to cases of self-defense during an armed attack. This principle was reinforced by the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relative to Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States (2003) since it clarifies that the “self-defense” provision in the UN Charter cannot be used loosely and that it only applies to real large-scale state-level armed attacks. In that case, Iran claimed that U.S naval forces had destroyed three Iranian offshore oil-production platforms in the Persian Gulf, arguing that the attacks were unlawful under international law. The ICJ subsequently ruled that the U.S. could not rationalize this destruction as self-defense because there was no evidence of an initial armed attack by Iran, emphasizing that isolated incidents or retaliatory strikes do not meet the legal requirements for self-defense. By establishing a clear precedent, this case illustrates that ambiguous military actions taken without definitive proof of an armed attack cannot be legally justified as acts of self-defense under international law.

Moreover, the Trump administration has not adequately explained why it believes trafficking in illicit narcotics should be considered “hostilities” equivalent to an armed attack led by organized actors, an omission further demonstrating how the strikes constitute a violation of international law. In addition to the aforementioned case, Prosecutor v. Tadic (1995) created relevant international precedent, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) considered whether the violence between Bosnian Serb forces and other groups during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted an armed conflict under international law. The court held that a nonstate group only counts as belligerent in an armed conflict if it is an “organized armed group” with a clear command structure and is actively participating in the hostilities. 

Acting contrary to this precedent, the Trump administration has targeted the Venezuelan groups Tren de Aragua and the Cartel de los Soles even though the U.S. intelligence community has characterized at least one of them, Tren de Aragua, as “decentralized” and consisting of “loosely organized cells of localized individual criminal networks.” If the individuals on the boats were in fact drug traffickers belonging to one of these groups, this distinction is crucial. Treating such criminal networks as armed belligerents risks stretching international law beyond its intended limits, undermining the legal standards that govern the use of military force. 

Furthermore, since the Trump administration has acted without congressional approval, the military strikes also raise serious questions about the limits of presidential war powers. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S Constitution grants Congress the sole power to declare war and authorize force, but the administration has not obtained Congress’s approval for the strikes. Instead, the Trump administration is relying on a conceptualization of presidential authority established by Article II of the Constitution which states that “the President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army”. Many scholars, along with officials in the Office of Legal Counsel, argue that Article II grants the president inherent authority to authorize strikes against military targets. However, its scope is controversial among legal scholars due to additional  vague language claiming that “executive power shall be vested in the President”. Opposing scholars, including some Supreme Court justices, maintain that the Constitution intentionally divides foreign policy responsibilities between the President and Congress. This Article has also never been fully tested in federal court. Historically, presidential actions justified under Article II have been tolerated, but it is important to emphasize that they typically targeted individuals understood to be combatants, neither suspected “narcoterrorists” nor civilians. Considering this historical precedent, the administration’s reliance on Article II could stretch the limits of presidential authority and set a precedent for unilateral military actions without congressional oversight. This concern is reflected in legislation that would have required the Trump administration to receive approval from Congress before initiating military action against Venezuela. Ultimately, without explicit congressional approval, such actions risk setting a precedent that could significantly expand the scope of presidential war powers. 

The administration’s authorization of strikes in international waters thus highlights the underexamined limits of presidential authority relative to the military and the U.S.’s obligations under international law, illustrating how unilateral actions can undermine both constitutional and global legal frameworks. Even though the United States does not formally recognize the jurisdiction of international courts, it remains bound by customary international norms, including those governing prohibitions on the use of force and respect for state sovereignty. This understanding is significant because it demonstrates that the U.S cannot avoid accountability for actions that violate established international principles. 

Disregarding these norms undermines the global legal framework that protects all states from unlawful intervention and risks weakening the credibility of the U.S as a nation that claims to maintain international order. Upholding these standards is therefore crucial for both global stability and the legitimacy of U.S foreign policy and military action, and failure to do so could set a dangerous precedent for future unilateral uses of force.