America’s Antitrust Renaissance: Big Tech and the Sherman Act

 The United States government is facilitating an antitrust renaissance. The emergence of neo-trustbusting comes in the wake of Big Tech corporations toeing the line between anti-democratic monopolies and fair economic competition. Recent court decisions and ongoing cases regarding the Big Tech industry have dealt with the issue of what monopolies look like in the world of tech, and how far the federal government can intervene in private enterprise in the name of prioritizing democracy. The modern revival of antitrust laws in U.S. federal courts, largely driven by developments in the Big Tech industry, has prioritized safeguarding democracy but is showing signs of blurring the line between corporate competition and judicial intervention.

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was the first major judicial restraint allowing for the era of trustbusting U.S. corporations, following the turn of the century. In direct response to the Gilded Age’s monopolies controlling the domestic economy, the U.S. government enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act. The act promoted laissez-faire economics, facilitating capitalism and ultimately democracy. This act comprises two distinct sections: Section 1 prohibits constraints on trade, and Section 2 prohibits monopolization.

By prohibiting restraints on trade and monopolization, the Act aimed to prevent any one corporation from gaining enough economic power to dominate markets or influence political life, which lawmakers saw as essential for protecting fair competition and the foundations of American democracy. During the early twentieth century, the written provisions in the Sherman Act were used to break up large industrial corporations such as the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company; today, such precedence is being tested in the realm of their contemporary economic equally large technological corporations, otherwise known as “Big Tech.” 

In the case of United States v. Google LLC (2023), 17 U.S. states sued Google LLC for its violation of both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Section 1 violation is due to the illegal use of Google's search engine and advertisement server, and the violation of Section 2 stems from the monopolization of search engines. Meaning, Google, up until the final decision of this case in April of 2025, was the automatic default search engine system for most major pieces of technology in the U.S. These agreements limit corporate competition by shutting out other search engines from default placement on major devices. As a result, competing companies cannot realistically enter the market, since users rarely switch away from the automatically installed option. The U.S. argued that Google executed this monopolization through anti-competitive practices of making agreements with other major Big Tech companies, such as Samsung and Apple.

In the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia, Google was found guilty on April 17, 2025, for their anti-competitive and monopolistic practices that violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. While this case is technically done, appeals from Google are likely.The District Court’s ruling against Google LLC—a publicly traded Big Tech giant—opens the door for more landmark antitrust cases. By relying on the Sherman Act, the decision signals a return to aggressive federal enforcement not seen since Theodore Roosevelt’s “trustbusting” era.

Furthermore, this recent precedent set in United States v. Google LLC is relevant to the similar, ongoing case of United States v. Apple Inc. Though the U.S. found Google to be violating antitrust laws for its monopolistic control of search engines, Apple is currently being accused of having a monopoly over “tech ecosystems,” meaning device compatibility. 

In the ongoing case, the U.S. Department of Justice and 16 states are suing Apple Inc. for alleged infringement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The U.S. claims that Apple has illegally monopolized tech ecosystems as it prohibits compatibility between Apple devices and non-Apple devices. Thus, by restricting device compatibility for Apple to non-Apple products, such as smart watches, laptops, and even cross-platform messaging, the DOJ believes Apple is engaging in anti-competitive practices. Given the nature of the antitrust violation in the United States v. Apple Inc. case, it is likely that a similar decision will be reached to that of U.S. v. Google LLC, especially considering how similar the Section 2 violations are in both cases. 

The facts of these two cases point towards a judicial trend of neo-trustbusting. Anti-monopoly cases have historically been attempts to mitigate the consolidation of economic power. However, this trend of government intervention in private enterprise is alarming, as government regulation in Big Tech is uncharted. Without a concrete tech case that serves as precedent, the federal government might cross the line of judicial overreach in the name of trying to safeguard democracy.

While there is no distinct overreach in any of the current cases aiming to stop and/or prevent monopolistic practices, this antitrust renaissance raises the issue of balance between economic competition and federal intervention in the age of Big Tech and concerns of threats to American democracy. Trustbusting is by no means a new practice in the U.S., but antitrust doctrine, i.e. the Sherman Act) is being used on a wide scale, and in a new field. While it is important to maintain American democracy, the federal courts must be aware of the possibility that aggressive intervention in Big Tech could unintentionally extend judicial power beyond its traditional boundaries.

The outcomes of United States v. Google LLC and the ongoing case against Apple underscore this tension. These cases show how the Sherman Act is being revived to address new forms of digital monopolization, even as courts navigate uncertain legal ground. Looking ahead, clearer standards for identifying monopolistic behavior in tech—such as rules on default settings, platform compatibility, and ecosystem control— could help ensure that intervention remains focused on genuine anti-competitive practices. Such guidelines would allow courts to protect fair competition without drifting into broader oversight of technology that risks limiting innovation or expanding judicial reach.